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Abstract
The task of creating a public will is daunting in any political system, but a democracy dedicated to the 
principles of participation and public deliberation faces specific challenges, including overcoming 
organized opposition that may not accept democratic tenets. In the sphere of education (and social 
reproduction more generally), business- influenced movements to reform public education question 
many of the established goals and norms of democratic education and thus may be the vanguard of 
such opposition. In order to interpret and explore these movements, this article enlists Amy 
Gutmann’s work as a heuristic device. In so doing, it looks at the task of instituting a unified public 
school system and organized opposition to this task within the context of a democratic polity and its 
deliberative processes.
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Now, surely nothing but universal education can 
counterwork this tendency to the domination of capital 
and the servility of labor.
— Horace Mann, Fifth Annual Report to the  
Board of Education of Massachusetts, 1842
Introduction
The task of creating a public will is daunting in any political system, but a democracy dedicated to the principles of participation and public deliberation 
faces specific challenges, including overcoming organized opposi-
tion that may not accept democratic tenets. In the sphere of 
education (and social reproduction, more generally), 
Brian Ford has taught at the university level from UPenn to 
Phnom Penh with stops in India, Albania, Bangladesh, and New 
Jersey. He started teaching high school with the New York City 
Department of Education over 20 years ago. He is the author of one 
book, Respect for Teachers: The Rhetoric Gap and How Research on 
Schools has Laid the Ground for New Business Models in Education 
(Rowman and Littlefield, 2012). He also has four manuscripts in 
process, two on education, one on the concept of hegemony, and the 
last, The Pursuit of Property, on Washington, Jefferson, and slavery.
business- influenced movements to reform public education 
question many of the established goals and norms of democratic 
education and thus may be the vanguard of such opposition. In 
order to interpret and explore these movements, this article enlists 
Amy Gutmann’s work as a heuristic device. In so doing, it looks at 
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both the task of instituting a unified public school system and the 
organized opposition to this task within the context of a 
democratic polity and its deliberative processes.
Since the 1980s, education policy in the U.S. has been 
increasingly influenced by business interests and ideologies. 
Examples include accountability regimes based on standardized 
tests, public asset privatization (such as charter schools), perfor-
mance pay (sometimes referred to as merit pay), the importation of 
business “best practices,” changes in labor relations, changing 
systems of evaluation, an advocacy of administrative autonomy (as 
opposed to teacher autonomy), and a move away from civics 
education, physical education, arts education, and music educa-
tion (see, for example, Cookson, 2013; Cuban, 2004; Giroux, 2015; 
Levin, 2001/2018; Nichols & Berliner, 2007).
These are intertwined and for the most part have a common 
political lineage; they are based on market emulation models that 
promote hierarchical authority structures, lessen professional 
teacher autonomy, and at the same time provide opportunities for 
private entities to make profits in the public education sector.
What is striking is that, since the 1980s, the form that influ-
ence takes, the positions that business takes, and the authority that 
business wields can plausibly be interpreted as a direct response to 
Amy Gutmann’s Democratic Education (1987), perhaps as an 
attempt to refute its premises and principles. Rather than a 
discourse on the problematic of education in a democratic society, 
however, there is an emphasis on evaluation systems devised by 
outside experts, concepts of merit, and the promotion of adminis-
trative autonomy vis- à- vis teachers.
Specifically, significant aspects of the pro- market education 
reform movement seem to closely and negatively correlate to the 
arguments Gutmann (1987) made in favor of deliberative democ-
racy and egalitarian social goals. Moreover, two principles that 
Gutmann said must not be abandoned— nonrepression and 
nondiscrimination— are no longer reasons for revamping the 
system but are addressed, if at all, not by core changes but by 
programs appendant and appurtenant to the main. Finally— and 
potentially both more important and most intriguing— there is an 
effort to recast the three sources of authority that Gutmann held 
are foundational in education: the state, parents, and professionals.
Gutmann’s (1987) analysis of parents, the state, and profes-
sional educators as the three sources of authority in education 
seems to provide a playbook for political action. This program 
consists of coopting parents via school choice, narrowing the state’s 
mission, and attacking and marginalizing educators; in addition, 
the profession is divided hierarchically, as tasks such as curriculum 
development fall to outside educational experts and exclude 
classroom teachers. Accordingly, this article is an exploratory 
piece, a heuristic exercise that examines this lineage by tracing 
what might be regarded as an attempt to negate and counter the 
influence of Gutmann’s work.
Thus, what I suggest, half as a conceit, half as a 
description— and only speculatively as an explanation of how 
ideological justifications are produced— is that business influence 
manifests itself in contemporary education reform as a point- by- 
point rejection of Gutmann’s (1987) central goals and seems 
determined to be systematic in its rejection of Gutmann’s conclu-
sions. One could call identifying this “seeming” a hunch, but it is a 
hunch supported by evidence that points to such a pattern. There 
are different types of decision- making. Consumers make decisions 
that are somewhat different from the decisions a business makes 
and much different from the process of deliberative decision- 
making in a democracy. A chief example is the set of business 
logics focused upon marketing products to different population 
segments; these have to do with the discovery of individual 
preferences and associated “profit pools,” including behavioral 
triggers to get people to buy, not with collective decision- making. 
This runs counter to the ideal of “conscious social reproduction” in 
Gutmann and may reveal and clarify a diametric opposition 
between market- based education and democratic education.
Overall, outcomes are based on the aggregation of individual 
projects. The motivations of business and the interests of investor 
classes cohere in such a manner as to advance policies that allow 
for the greatest freedom of action for owners and model the labor 
market so as to align with business needs and are, as a result, 
antithetical to liberal democratic concerns.
The paper is divided into eight sections:
The first is “Conceits, Caveats, and Deliberative Models of 
Authority.” It outlines three models of authority, each based solely 
on only one of the three types: the family state, in which children 
are educated for the good of the state and the sake of social 
harmony; the state of families, in which parents are entrusted to 
make choices for and pursue the best interests of their children; 
and the state of individuals, which relies on educational profes-
sionals and expert knowledge to create institutions which maxi-
mize the future choice of children.
It begins by defining what I mean by “conceit” and continues 
with the exploration of how business entered into this discourse 
and the effects of that entrance, emphasizing this key point: 
Business logics are guided by self- interest; democratic logics work 
to arrive at a collective interest.
The second is “Some Personal and Historical Background, 
Plus Diametric Opposition.” While I am not proposing that there is 
a simple binary opposition between business and democracy as 
one would explain them abstractly or might allegorically personify 
them, I am noting there is at least a diametric and recurring 
tension between accepted values in business (as reinforced 
especially by competitive business practice) and normative values 
in liberal democracy, especially those advocating democratic 
deliberation. One impact of this dynamic that seems obvious is 
that, keeping in mind the power of wealth, democratic practitio-
ners tend to call for state oversight and regulation of private 
projects, while business practitioners tend to look askance at such 
state actions, labeling them counterproductive. This is not true in 
all cases, but overall, whether deliberation is considered a method 
of democratic- will formation or a total theory of democratic 
society, it will likely rub business the wrong way. The impact of 
profit- seeking enterprises, in contrast, is largely actuated by 
advancing a particularistic set of interests, a set of preferences that 
are likely to come into conflict with the set of interests arrived at by 
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a process of deliberation that is thought to be constitutive and to 
reshape preferences.
The contrast is clear. Deliberative democratic logics draw on a 
normative theory of the educational purposes of society, which 
postulates that democracy must shape education so that the 
educated are capable of deliberation. This section also begins a 
brief discussion drawing on John Dewey’s (1916/1997) Democracy 
and Education that continues in the following sections.
This includes the third section, “Neoliberal Ideology, the 
Public Will and Organized Opposition,” which begins with attacks 
on public education that go back 60 years or so, to Admiral 
Rickover and President Eisenhower in the 1950s promoting 
back- to- basics education and explicitly attacking Dewey’s influ-
ence. Briefly summarizing some of the main tenets of neoliberal-
ism as expounded on by Bourdieu, Harvey, and others, I then 
expand on Dewey’s defense of democratic education. For Dewey, 
to “participate in an interest” is more than a transaction— it is a 
transformative experience, sharply distinct from merely following 
an interest. Preferences are not assumed but are reshaped during 
the deliberative process. Thus, there is an antagonism between the 
particularistic interests that drive business practice and its 
aggregated outcomes and the communicated experience that arises 
out of deliberation on shared, overlapping, and sometimes 
conflicting interests. The section concludes by quickly looking at 
the perspectives of, among others, William Weld, Milton Fried-
man, Myron Lieberman, and John Chubb and Terry Moe.
“Proxies for Children, a Purported Insight, and Changed 
Questions: Agendas, Authority, and Influence,” the fourth section 
briefly considers the question “Why should the business commu-
nity not also be considered a source of authority?” It eventually 
reviews Gutmann’s (1987) critiques of focusing on one type of 
authority in education, but it first points out that, unlike business, 
all three of Gutmann’s sources of authority have custodial roles. 
The business community has no such role except in the small 
minority of cases in which schools are being run as businesses, but 
parents, the state, and schools serve as proxies for children in 
different ways— in terms of, respectively, direct parental custody, 
the state’s role as custodian of last resort, and the schools’ role in 
loco parentis.
The fifth section, “Contrasting Perspectives on Testing 
Regimes, Productivity, and Creativity,” considers paradigm change 
and how testing and data are central to contemporary education 
reform. Paradigm change is, of course, broader than this and 
includes privatization and the deregulation movement.1 Still, in 
1 Paradigm change involves much more than testing and data collec-
tion, which are instrumental techniques, but testing nonetheless enables 
other policies, such as pay- for- performance and phasing out “failing 
schools.” We can think of testing as one pillar of a market- emulation 
paradigm— a proxy for profits. School choice and competition are others:
Public school education has experienced notable changes in 
governance and control over the past three decades primarily 
due to school choice laws and policies. . . . the growth in magnet 
schools and quasi- public schools such as charter schools, as well 
as the use of public dollars to finance a private- school education 
reviewing changes in educational discourse and policy, especially 
in the 1980s and 1990s, it is argued that business perspectives most 
often hold that we set the strong- minded and capable economic 
actors who can navigate the market in motion and watch them 
make change. Equity and social justice became secondary 
concerns. 
This, again, contrasts with perspectives that emphasize 
democratic practice, but the section also raises the question of 
creativity and how the testing paradigm has affected it. Most 
pedagogical programs at least give lip service to producing critical 
and creative thinkers, but for advocates of democratically oriented 
education, this means capable democratic actors who, among 
other things, might question the wisdom of constantly following 
the directions in which the market and its incentives take us. For 
business- oriented educators, it means encouraging those who 
produce innovations that may have value in the market. Mean-
while, creativity among youth has declined and education reforms 
are all over the place— in some places drill- and- kill is adopted as 
much as problem- based learning because the tests are standard-
ized and the answers can be memorized, at least many of them.
“Capitalist Exploitation, Good and Bad: Contending Perspec-
tives Historically Considered” is the sixth section. This is a 
meta- theoretical section, considering “the problems of 
capital(ism)’s excesses.” If we take the three factors of production, 
land, labor, and capital, the last is the dominant factor in capital-
ism. Moreover, the way capitalism works, capital is mean to exploit 
the other factors of production. The section looks briefly at the 
historical context of business influence, especially as identified by 
Kliebard (1986).
“Business Logics and the Marginalization of Democratic 
Deliberation” is the seventh section. Identifying business logics 
with a specific, market- oriented version of what Kliebard (1986) 
called the “social efficiency” approach, the section begins by 
arguing that this was hardly how education was argued for in the 
early days of the American republic. In contemporary discourse,  
in contrast, we are more likely to see mainstream business logics in 
which the goal of creating a deliberative democracy engaged  
in conscious social reproduction is eschewed in favor of accepting 
the outcomes of the market. There is also some mention of the 
march of great men (and some women) of talent pursuing simulta-
neously their own self- interest and their own idiosyncratic vision à 
la Ayn Rand. This is the core of business influence and how it 
operates. It is no longer the foremost role of public education to 
foster basic democratic principles, such as equal opportunity and 
liberty, that have an inherent value, but education is an instrument 
to other ends. It advocates the pervasive theory that, if not the 
family, then the state and educational professionals might in fact be 
with vouchers have made it more challenging to recognize who 
or what controls public schools in each state. The transformation 
in school choice policies has been made possible mainly because 
of the United States’ political and economic environment that 
supports deregulation, marketplace competition, and decentral-
ization. (Thompson Dorsey & Plucker)
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the source of a problem that could be solved by applying common 
sense— the common sense of what works in business.
Finally, the eighth section, “The Common Sense of Segmenta-
tion,” considers some of the dangers we encounter because what 
works in business is not always something that works in democ-
racy. In business, inequality, class, and stratification are not 
necessarily concerns— in fact, they may be seen as opportunities. 
The question then becomes, what happens to education when the 
primary ethos of a society is acquisitive, grasping— in short, 
monetary? Looking at the dynamic of stratification, it points to 
something new that, while it is not so neatly delimited, we can 
nonetheless see clearly in the institutional forms of publicly funded 
education. Business strategies that aim to segment the market  
in education have shown robust growth, and since the 1980s, 
marketers have used economic and behavioral theories combined 
with data heavy analytical techniques to identify market segments 
and develop strategies to take advantage of differentiation oppor-
tunities. What private business strategies do is segment the market. 
The section then examines how a market or population is subdi-
vided into segments with defined similar characteristics— dividing 
a broad target market into “subsets of consumers” who have 
common needs and priorities.
In conclusion, decision- making by consumers, businesses, 
and deliberators in a democracy are different in kind. The question 
is raised as to whether the pervasiveness of business and consumer 
logics conflict with the promise of egalitarian democracy. The first 
two are centered on individual interests, but the last is collective. 
The last is also largely based on the promise of public 
education— that it function to educate the vast majority of citizens 
so that they may aspire and succeed, participate in politics, have 
sufficient agency to help to shape the future.
Conceits, Caveats, and Deliberative Models of Authority
According to the political philosopher Amy Gutmann (1987), there 
are, broadly speaking, three types of political theories of education: 
those that give authority over education to the family, those that 
give it to the state, and those that give it to education professionals. 
Gutmann then outlined three models, each based solely on only 
one of the three types: the state of families, in which parents are 
entrusted to make choices for and pursue the best interests of their 
children; the family state, in which children are educated for the 
good of the state and the sake of social harmony; and the state of 
individuals, which relies on educational professionals and expert 
knowledge to create institutions that maximize the future choice of 
children, “without prejudicing children towards any controversial 
conception of the good life” (Gutmann, p. 34).
Of course, whenever one says there are three kinds of any-
thing, it is a simplification and often a conscious oversimplification 
for the sake of clarify. In this case, for instance, one might consider 
human communities other than the state as being sources of 
authority; one might question the definition of family; and one 
might wonder if, as an alternative to education professionals,  
we might consider giving authority to those who are deemed 
somehow to have a “calling” for educating the young. It is unlikely 
that Guttmann (1987), whose Democratic Education has been 
praised as the most important book on the role of education in a 
democracy since Dewey (Yudof, 1989), is unaware of this. Rather, 
she has not been willing to embrace any single viewpoint but 
offered a model that incorporates all three, seeking a balance 
among them.
The point of her argument is clear: None of the above is by 
itself sufficient for a democratic polity. Gutmann ended up 
rejecting all three models. Unwilling to embrace any of these 
viewpoints, she called for a “democratic state of education [which] 
attempts to balance the power of the state, parents, and educational 
experts and officials” (Gutmann, 1987, p. 42).
With all this, it is interesting to note that “business” and 
“markets,” so much the woof and warp of contemporary debates on 
education reform, are words that do not appear among her chapter 
titles or the titles of the subsections. Nor is business included in her 
threefold division of authority. This is doubly striking because the 
most forceful calls for education reform of the current day look not 
to the state, not to the family, not to “future” individuals (nor, by 
any means, to educational professionals acting on their behalf) to 
be the main actor. Rather, they seek to authorize a fourth group  
to shape the future of public education in the U.S.: business. If one 
were to rank the influence of different coalitions on education 
policy in the U.S., near the top would be the coalition centered  
on the globally connected business community and those who  
feel they have a calling to use business methods to improve and 
reform the school system.
Further, this rewriting of authority also has consequences for 
both curriculum, in both its broad and narrow senses, and for 
Gutmann’s (1987) major principles, those of nondiscrimination 
and nonrepression. Cuban (2004) listed three questions that 
remain “unasked by business- inspired reform [and] go unan-
swered today.” First, do “schools geared toward preparing workers 
also build literate, active, and morally sensitive citizens who carry 
out their civic duties?” Second, if it is possible at all, how “can 
schools develop independently thinking citizens who earn their 
living in corporate workplaces?” These two overlap considerably 
with much of the discussion below, but Cuban also raised a third: 
When “unemployment increases, and graduates have little money 
to secure higher education or find a job matched to their skills, will 
public schools, now an arm of the economy, get blamed— as they 
have in the past— for creating the mismatch” (Cuban, 2004, 
pp. 237– 240)?
In addition, however, omitted from the current economic and 
political agendas, we can include two of Gutmann’s (1987) major 
normative principles, those of nondiscrimination and nonrepres-
sion. Gutmann’s principles of nondiscrimination and nonexclu-
sion are sometimes given lip service, but the ways they are 
normally used— to buoy “high- performing charter schools” or 
programs to revamp teacher evaluation— are not necessarily 
consistent with providing high- quality education for everyone  
or improving the quality of teaching.2
2 I realize this, along with others that follow, is an argument that still 
needs to be made more fully. I will not do so here, however, because this 
article is quite long as it is. Besides, reaching any definitive conclusion 
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The principle of nondiscrimination states all educable 
children must be educated, not, as often is the case with private 
schools, vouchers, and charters, as with programs that select poor 
students with potential and send them elsewhere,3 that some 
children will be selected out to go to better schools.
The related principle of nonexclusion means that no one may 
be excluded from being educated so as to have the tools for 
participating in our democracy. However, while testing regimes 
and pay- for- performance systems do develop tools, the tools they 
are likely to develop are arguably much narrower. This is for many 
reasons, including gaming the system and deep- seated social 
inequalities and social pathologies associated with lower socio-
economic status.
One is tempted to say that in most current debates, nondis-
crimination and nonexclusion are not imperatives but platitudes. 
Accordingly, the present article starts from a conceit— that 
business influence manifests itself in education reform as a 
point- by- point rejection of the central goals of Gutmann’s (1987) 
Democratic Education. This is not a fact but a somewhat fanciful 
would be, to say the least, difficult. The argument in favor of school 
choice aligns with our common sense as consumers in the market: It 
engenders competition, and this will be a positive force “generat[ing] 
greater educational opportunities, particularly for disadvantaged 
students.” The premise is that “competitive incentives will change the 
organizational behavior of schools” and districts, leading “to more 
equitable access for students across varied and often segregated urban 
landscapes” (Lubienski, Gulosino, & Weitzel, 2009). Nonetheless, the 
premise has been challenged; indeed, Lubienski, Gulosino, and Weitzel 
(2009) pointed to “patterns of exclusionary strategies that schools 
embraced to enhance market position.” More critically, Thompson 
Dorsey and Roulhac (2019) argued, first, that “school choice policies 
and the movement to privatize education have become the currently 
preferred school reform methods on both the state and federal levels,” 
but, then said this seems to be merely “under the guise they will provide 
equal educational opportunities and access for all students,” and further 
“contend[ed] that the present- day school choice and privatization 
movements may be a part of a larger social, political, and legal cycle of 
inequality that has established residence in the American educational 
system for more than a century” (pp. 420– 441). Clearly there are 
different schools of thought on this.
3 Examples would include Prep for Prep (PFP) and A Better Chance 
(ABC). For others, see “A Guide to Programs Sending Kids to Better 
Schools,” accessed November 2019 at https:// www .education .com/ 
magazine/ article/ Scholarship _Programs _that _Send/. I mention PFP and 
ABC not to single them out for criticism but merely because at different 
times in my life I interviewed with both of them, and I did so because I 
felt they both had the potential to make positive contributions. However, 
neither seems to be truly scalable to the degree one would need, and 
both also have potential negative effects because they remove students 
from their home communities. Instead of addressing the inequality 
of neighborhood resources and building up “a cadre of role models 
accessible to students” in their neighborhood or community, they “take 
the opposite approach— they take students into educational settings 
where high levels of community resources already exist” (Gandera, with 
Bial, 2001, p. 33). For an in- depth account based on interviews with 
participants, see R. Martin, 2019.
argument, and it cannot be proven conclusively one way or 
another. However, I offer as a hypothesis that we can presents facts, 
patterns of events, and transconfigurations of discourse that point 
to a paradigm shift in education, or at least multiple efforts to 
change the paradigm of public education. These seem to have 
foundational understandings of education’s role in society that are 
economistic and run counter to Gutmann’s foundational under-
standings of education’s role in a democratic society.
Thus the conceit is that there is both a systematic disavowal of 
her goals, treating them as, at best, lower priorities, and a grand 
strategy that draws on her description of the three pillars of 
authority in education in order to bring about political support for 
this economistic changes. As a suggestion, it can open avenues of 
inquiry— the conceit is meant to be an imaginative construct 
pointing to the negative correlation between the principles of 
deliberative democracy and pervasive business logics. In turn, this 
leads to a more sophisticated understanding of the objects of the 
comparisons and of the processes by which education reform has 
accrued.
The word “conceit” is often used in literary criticism to 
describe metaphors. According to Dame Helen Gardner (1961), “a 
conceit is a comparison whose ingenuity is more striking than its 
justness . . . we are made to concede likeness while being strongly 
conscious of unlikeness” (Gardner, p. xxiii).4 Thus anyone seeking 
a detailed, sociological, or technical depiction of ideological 
production will be disappointed; rather, the purpose at hand is to 
draw attention to certain aspects of business- oriented education 
reform that run contrary to democratic ends in general and to 
deliberative democracy and democratic education in particular.5
Gutmann’s understanding of education has been tightly 
coupled with her work on deliberative democracy,6 as she has 
claimed that democratic education must have as its goal the 
development and instilling of deliberative character, one consisting 
4 Shakespeare, however, gives the word to Edgar in King Lear, so as 
to mean “illusion” or “imagination”: “I know not how conceit may rob/
The treasury of life, when life itself/Yields to the theft” (Act IV, Scene VI; 
Edgar is speaking about his newly blind father, Gloucester, who relies  
on Edgar’s reports to imagine the reality about him).
5 There is, nonetheless, one very relevant point to be made on ideologi-
cal justifications: Their political production and formation involves 
coalitions. For instance, taking the coalition pushing for reform along 
Democrats for Education Reform (DFER) lines, there are three groups 
with different beliefs who converge. There are “true believers,” who think 
the statistics, case studies, and other research shows that we should  
adopt these measures to improve the system; there are political actors 
who see political advantage in adopting those positions; and there are 
those who think the adoption of these measures presents an economic 
opportunity.
6 This has also been both well- regarded and highly influential. More-
over, it is worth noting that Gutmann has been a practical educator at the 
highest level, becoming the president of the University of Pennsylvania 
in 2004. How being the president of a private, voluntary, and selective 
university relates to her understandings of public, compulsory, and uni-
versal K– 12 education is, however, an open question.
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of “sturdy moral character” together with “a developed capacity for 
reasoning.” The democratic state of education does not merely 
balance different types of authority— it also questions all authority. 
The inculcation of deliberative character should be democratic 
education’s particular purpose: “Children must learn not just to 
behave in accordance with authority but to think critically about 
authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal of sharing 
political sovereignty as citizens” (Gutmann, 1987, p. 51).
Authority is a central issue, and an anecdote may bring some 
clarity. In my twenties, I wore a button that said, “Question 
Authority,” sometimes pinned to a T-shirt with the words, “Read, 
Think, Write, Speak.” (I also at different times wore a button that 
said, “Wearing buttons is not enough,” but that is another story.) 
The “Question Authority” button bothered one friend. He was a 
vice president (among many) of a major Swiss investment bank, 
and he grimaced with impatience as he asked why I had to bring 
attention to myself with that button. I explained that behind my 
snarky, critical, idealist persona, I was a democratic pragmatist and 
thus wanted to bring attention to our role as critics of those 
elements of our system that were unjust, wrongheaded, or unwise.
His take on pragmatism was different than mine. A few years 
later he told me, “Over time you become more pragmatic.” When 
asked what he meant by “pragmatic,” he responded, almost as if the 
answer to the question was self- evident, “I mean pragmatic in your 
own self- interest” (Anonymous, personal communication, May 
1994).
One need not rely on that single quote; one need only look  
at business magazines and the advice they offer. The ideology of 
business— its foundational understandings— is manifest in the 
advice given to people who want to get ahead and which the 
magazines say they would do well to take to heart. Moreover, they 
tend to project that life- view on everyone else as well.
Certainly it was true that my friend had grown more prag-
matic as he grew older. However, it was not, for him, a personal 
statement: He stated it as a general truth. I don’t want to make too 
big a generalization, but this life- view holds that those who do not 
put their self- interest front and center are somehow deluding 
themselves by indulging “an overdeveloped sense of social justice.”7 
Whether it applies to everyone or not, business affects this, at least 
to a degree; if we are involved in business day in, day out, we then 
become more calculating— and self- interestedly pragmatic— as we 
adopt the norms of business.
That points to the key point: Business logics are guided by 
self- interest; democratic logics work to arrive at a collective 
interest. The attitude toward authority is illustrative. While I would 
argue that questioning authority is a necessary and constitutive 
part of deliberative democracy, business logics how to understand 
7 For an example of how those with an “overdeveloped sense of justice” 
are prone to over- the- top “indignation,” see the discussion between 
business and law school students (one of whom has a bullhorn) and soci-
ology grad students (one of whom quotes Schiller and begins to define 
post- structuralism), in Tucker Max (2012), Sloppy Seconds, Blue Heeler, 
pp. 26– 27. I am not quite sure, incidentally, how this book ended up in 
my house.
authority and how it affects opportunity. Not to put too fine a point 
on this key point, we can say that instead of questioning it, one 
accepts and reinforces authority, strengthens administrative 
hierarchy, and brings in administrative experts to make money off 
newly strengthened hierarchies.
Still, business logics do not accept authority passively; rather, 
they analyze and adapt themselves to it, manipulate and seek to 
direct it. In business and economic activity, the questioning of 
authority is, accordingly, not primary; rather, stress is on the ability 
to recognize and take advantage of opportunities. Along with this 
comes the ability to sometimes construct and promote opportuni-
ties. Entrepreneurs find niches— this is part of the foundational 
understanding— but politically networked entrepreneurs can 
create niches. They do not so much question authority as massage 
and then redirect it.
This is the contrast to which the conceit will point: Business 
logics turn the logic of deliberative democracy on its head. 
Deliberative democracy can be defined
as a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their 
representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one 
another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, 
with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on 
all citizens but open to challenge in the future. (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004, p. 7; see also discussion, pp. 4– 21, some of which is 
paraphrased immediately following)
Deliberation, to the extent it is inclusive and nonarbitrary, legiti-
mizes political decisions. The standard that is enshrined is the 
collective judgment of the governed as arrived at by an open and 
mutually respectful processes of public decision- making that 
posits public- spirited perspectives.
In business, however, it is the aggregated judgment of those 
engaging in economic activity that is the standard. A thousand (or 
a million) choices add up to what the market tells us. While there 
are some arguments that this will inevitably be in the public 
interest, that is hardly foreordained. The most famous quote 
indicating the benign effects from the market is, of course, from 
Adam Smith (1776):
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the baker, or the brewer 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. 
We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self- love, and 
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. 
(Smith, chapter 2)
Self- interest is not greed, however. That Smith distinguished 
between self- interest and selfishness is often ignored.8 Significantly, 
this ignorance might not be accidental, but a common 
occurrence— a mental construct— in a competitive, calculating, 
8 Smith’s paragraph begins:
He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self- love 
in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage 
to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to 
another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. (Kennedy, 
2009a, 2009b)
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and self- interestedly pragmatic milieu that includes rent seekers as 
well as producers. One should note that Smith took his examples 
from a limited group of economic activities, all of which are 
producers for direct consumption; it is unlikely that Smith would 
have sanguinely and without caveat included financiers, public 
relations specialists, lobbyists (the word had not yet been coined), 
advertisers, or marketers alongside them.9 But even in the 
productive trades, according to Smith, we have to worry about 
cartels and combinations: “People of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation 
ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to 
raise prices” (Smith, 1776, book I, chapter X). Cartel formation, 
moreover, is an extreme example of a more general phenomenon.
Actors take the information they gather from the market to 
pragmatically pursue their self- interests. The goal in business is not 
to promote the legitimacy of collective decisions or subject 
preferences to scrutiny— preferences are a given to be discovered, 
the raw material on which to build business strategies. They are not 
questioned but used, manipulated in some instances, altered and 
shaped in others. Market research and advertising provide some 
salient examples; lobbying, think tanks, and philanthropy provide 
others.10 The point is not to deliberate and, when in disagreement, 
discover the reasons for this disagreement while still promoting 
mutual respect; rather, the point is to get the other to accept your 
view of what is necessary and worthwhile, to spend money on  
your product or to accept your point of view, and to get your 
project on track.
The contrast is clear. Deliberative democratic logics draw on a 
normative theory of the educational purposes of society which 
postulates that democracy must shape education so that the 
educated are capable of deliberation. It is a clever construction in 
which the snake swallows its own tale.11
Dewey (1916/1997) made much the same point and then 
extended upon it in Democracy and Education: “The devotion of 
democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial 
Greed— even the appearance of greed— would poison such a 
bargain.
9 Moreover, while often misquoted, Smith used “brewer” instead of 
“candlestick maker,” raising the question of whether he prioritized beer 
over light.
10 Theoretically extreme, but everyday and increasingly commonplace, 
are consumer- oriented business strategies that “push us to sever all links 
with the evidence of our senses.” Online strategies, such as
the monetisation of propaganda as “fake news”; the use of 
machine learning to develop user profiles accurately measuring 
and modeling our emotional states; the rise of neuromarketing, 
targeting highly tailored messages that nudge us to act in 
ways serving the ends of others; [and the] a new technology, 
“augmented reality,” [are among] the processes shaping our drift 
to a new world in which reality is both relative and carefully 
constructed by others, for their ends. (Pesce, 2017)
11 My apologies for the pun, but narratives and understandings in 
public discourse are central concerns.
explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage 
cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their 
governors are educated” (Dewey, pp. 91– 92). He then went on to 
say, “But there is a deeper explanation,” as discussed later.
Business logics, especially those that laud the invisible hand, 
frame the question of education much differently, looking for the 
individual to develop skills and capacities to navigate the system as 
it develops “naturally” over time. The individual is not a delibera-
tive citizen but a consumer following preferences or a potential 
worker seeking remunerated employment or an investor seeking 
opportunities.
This logic transfers to politics as opportunities must be 
recognized by power holders and they must devote resources to 
fully exploit them. This is true of both enterprises that must find 
their own revenue stream (the private sector) and those that 
depend on a revenue stream decided upon through collective 
decision- making as manifest in state action (the public sector). In 
addition, individuals must also produce their own revenue 
streams— or their families must.12
Of course, there are other business logics that stress factors 
having little to do with the “invisible hand,” such as organizational 
capacity and long- term management.13 Nonetheless, those that are 
management focused tend toward the hierarchical, not the 
democratic. Business logics emphasizing management do tend to 
run counter to narratives that focus on the entrepreneur, and it is 
arguable that much of the individualistic ethos fueling proposed 
neoliberal solutions diverts us, intentionally or otherwise, from the 
reality of managerial power. It can also be argued that investors, 
thanks in part to stockholder- rights movements and in larger part 
to improved financial communications and new financial instru-
ments, have gained the upper hand over the last 40 years at the 
expense of managers. One does not have to choose between these 
two, however. Both the reality of long- term managerial power and 
12 This is a thought, incidentally, made resoundingly by Margaret 
Thatcher when she said there was no such thing as society, only individu-
als and families. Here might be the fulcrum of the Thatcherite revolution, 
relevant in that we are presuming a paradigm change that took hold 
about the same time she took office (and she also had extensive plans for 
education). Interestingly and significantly, we can compare her statement 
to one from Dewey (1916/1997):
Society is one word, but many things. Men associate together in 
all kinds of ways and for all kinds of purposes. One man is con-
cerned in a multitude of diverse groups, in which his associates 
may be quite different. It often seems as if they had nothing in 
common except that they are modes of associated life. (Dewey, 
p. 86)
13 Particularly pertinent is Chandler’s The Visible Hand (1977), which 
highlighted administrative coordination, managerial hierarchy, and 
middle managers who preferred policies that favored long- term stability 
and growth of their enterprises to those that maximized current profits. 
He argued managerial hierarchy itself became a source of power, per-
manence, and continued growth; large enterprises grew and dominated 
major sectors of the economy, altering the basic structure of these sectors 
and of the economy as a whole.
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greater investor power are real things in education, however, as 
large companies take over management tasks formerly performed 
by public entities. As is usually the case in public asset privatiza-
tion, both investors and managers have opportunities to benefit.
In sum, according to the deliberative democratic logic, 
education is designed to promote and support open debate on 
public issues, critical thinking, collective outcomes, and mutual 
respect. This contrasts to business logics. In the neoliberal business 
logic, education is designed to allow for the pursuit of private 
interests, critical analysis of the changing market, individual 
adaptation, and aggregated outcomes. In the managerial business 
logic, education is designed to equip people who can man the 
machinery of business organizations.
The neoliberal logic calls for less state involvement and a 
curriculum based on the ability to find one’s niche. The administra-
tive logic calls for a curriculum that trains people to perform 
business tasks. Both give us a hint of what to expect as we now turn 
to the question of how business influences education.
Some Personal and Historical Background, Plus Diametric 
Opposition
This article is drawn from a manuscript waiting to be a book, 
Democratic Education and Markets, which takes half its title from 
Gutmann’s 1987 book but concentrates on business, markets, and 
the underlying goals thereof. It is not merely that business has 
influence in education debates— that is something that has been 
true since at least the early 1900s. What we find is that we are not 
dealing with disinterested policymaking but an agenda- laden 
process in which the agendas are not usually on the surface layers 
but are deeply rooted and are informed by the eye of the profit 
hunter (Ford 2016a, 2016b).
The implications of this for democracy have been widely 
commented upon. For instance, Paul Thomas (2013) argued:
Education reformers have framed the need for national standards, 
increased testing, and greater teacher accountability as essential for 
creating a world- class work force and to keep the U.S. competitive 
internationally. But this narrative serves as a mask for the ultimate 
results promised by such reform— shifting the locus of authority and 
expertise away from teachers, professors, and scholars [emphasis 
added] and to state created and enforced instruments that render 
people powerless and interchangeable. (pp. 204– 205)14
I would add that those “state created and enforced instruments” are 
both increasingly modeled upon the market, employing so- called 
best practices derived from business, and increasingly open to 
nonstate actors.
Since the 1980s, the form that influence takes, the positions 
that business takes and the authority that business wields, could 
plausibly be interpreted as a direct response to Gutmann 
14 In a shorter article for The Guardian (16 Nov 2010), Thomas sum-
marized: “The messages coming from state education in the US, then, are 
that government has failed and that only the private sector can save us.” 
One comment contested this, but yet another seconded it: “Education, 
like healthcare provision, is not a right but a business opportunity.”
(1987)— an attempt to refute its premises and principles. Thus, the 
article explores this lineage by tracing what might be regarded as a 
negative doppelganger of Gutmann’s work. Significant aspects of 
the pro- market education reform movement seem to closely and 
negatively correlate to the arguments she made in favor of 
deliberative democracy and egalitarian social goals. Accordingly, 
we expand on the conceit— that business influence manifests itself 
in education reform as a point- by- point rejection of Gutmann’s  
central goals.
Or, rather, we shall start from a conceit and a caveat, for while 
market- oriented education reform could be interpreted in this way, 
this is not to say that it actually developed this way. One need not 
posit a conspiracy.
One need not, but that is not to say there is no evidence to 
support conspiratorial coordination, either overt or covert. One 
can go back to Admiral Rickover and President Eisenhower in the 
1950s promoting back- to- basics education and explicitly attacking 
Dewey’s influence.15 Or one could look at soon to be Supreme 
Court Justice Louis Powell’s famous 1971 memo to the Chairman  
of the Education Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.16 
In the years that followed, many institutions, including the 
Heritage Foundation, the Manhattan Institute, the Cato Institute, 
Citizens for a Sound Economy, Accuracy in Academia (explicitly 
against “liberal bias in education”), and the Olin Foundation, were 
created.
15 Admiral Hyman Rickover, original head of development of the 
nation’s nuclear submarine program, wrote Education and Freedom 
(New York: Dutton, 1959) after the launch of the Sputnik by the Soviets. 
Rickover blamed Dewey, unfairly lumping him together with the “edu-
cationists” who had emphasized “life- adjustment education” focused 
on adolescents’ personal as opposed to their intellectual development. 
Thinking U.S. schools too lax and education standards too low to pro-
duce the technical expert who would be “the man of the future,” Rickover 
later wrote both Swiss Schools and Ours: Why Theirs are Better (Little, 
Brown, 1962) and American Education, a National Failure: The Problem 
of Our Schools and What We Can Learn from England (Dutton, 1963).
Eisenhower, as president, published a letter in Life magazine 
(March 15, 1959) that was similar. It descried the weaknesses of U.S. 
education and attributed them to Dewey’s influence while advocating 
a back- to- basics approach. The attacks, which were much more wide-
spread, were significant, and Jeffrey Herold (1974) said the “account of 
how Dewey had corrupted the schools was sheer fantasy” (p. 150).
16 While focused on the postsecondary level and advocating measures 
such as “establishing a staff of highly qualified scholars in the social 
sciences who do believe in the system . . . a staff of speakers of the 
highest competency . . . a Speaker’s Bureau [and the] evaluat[ion] of 
social science textbooks, especially in economics, political science 
and sociology,” he also called for “Action programs, tailored to the 
high schools and similar to those mentioned” for colleges. The covert 
memo’s confidentially became a thing of the past when it was leaked to 
Jack Anderson. In a syndicated column, “Powell’s Lesson to Business 
aired,” September 28, 1972, Anderson cited it, warning that Powell, who 
had been elevated to the Court in January of that year, “might use his 
position on the Supreme Court to put his ideas into practice . . . in behalf 
of business interests.”
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At the same time, Milton Friedman became a PBS star and  
anti- Keynesian monetarist texts multiplied while Paul Samuelson’s 
Keynesian- oriented Economics textbook ceased to the standard. Or 
we could look to the passage of Proposition 13, enacted in 1978, 
becoming article XIII A of the California Constitution, which 
limited the annual real estate tax on a parcel of property to 1% of its 
assessed value; since schools depend on property taxes, it had huge 
ramifications. Or there is A Nation at Risk (National Commission 
on Excellence in Education, 1983), discussed later. The actions of 
the Broad Foundation, the New Teacher Project, the Gates 
Foundation, and many others also point to multiple efforts.
Nonetheless, one need hardly contend that the movers and 
shakers of industry and finance gathered together at a conference 
center or an enormous private estate, read Gutmann’s work 
alongside Hayek’s and Ayn Rand’s, compared it unfavorably with 
those works, analyzed it point by point and then gathered together 
to launch a campaign to shape American education in the opposite 
way. Indeed, if you concentrate your explanation by offering up 
conspiracy theories, you miss a lot of the action. But if that is not 
what happened and if I am right that the main tenets of market- 
oriented education reform negatively correlate with Gutmann’s 
theory, then how did that happen? What forces led to this 
outcome?
Not to dismiss active efforts to shape thought, but if one does 
posit a conspiracy, certain dynamics will be overlooked. A large 
part of the answer to this puzzle is systematically rooted in the 
structure of economic incentives and accepted business strategies. 
Overall, we can suggest that the motivations of business and the 
interests of investor classes cohere in such a manner as to advance 
policies that, predictably, allow for the greatest freedom of action 
for owners, model the labor market so as to align with business 
needs, and are, as result, antithetical to liberal democratic concerns 
in general and, in particular to deliberative democracy and 
egalitarian goals (Ford, n.d.).
Take, for example, the business logics focused upon market-
ing products to different population segments. These do not have 
to do with collective decision- making, rather with the discovery of 
individual preferences in order to craft a business strategy. As will 
be discussed, the “collective” outcome is based on the aggregation 
of individual business projects.
Overall, this is not to propose there is a binary opposition 
between “business” and “democracy” as one would explain them 
abstractly or might allegorically personify them. “Business” and 
“democracy” both have too many aspects to do that. It is rather to 
note there is at least a diametric tension between accepted values in 
business (as reinforced especially by competitive business practice) 
and normative values in liberal democracy, especially those 
advocating democratic deliberation.17
17 This gives me a chance to acknowledge my two anonymous 
Democracy & Education reviewers, one of whom was quite positive, 
one of whom was more skeptical, both of whom offered insight and 
helped improve the article. The latter was particularly concerned that I 
had presented a “binary opposition between democracy and business,” 
something that I did not think was the case but had to admit was a 
We can illustrate this by posing a question: Should the 
democratic state have oversight authority and the ability to regulate 
private projects? If so, to what degree? I am not going to go into 
depth on this subject but just offer a heads- up: The democratic 
principle tends to call for an institutionalized state actor with 
oversight capacity and the ability to regulate private business 
actions to significant degree, but the business principle not  
so much.
This is not an absolute but a tendency. The “business side” 
during the early days of the republic through the 1840s was led by 
figures such as Hamilton and Henry Clay who called for an 
energetic federal government that could take on debt, run a 
banking system, fund infrastructure, and otherwise enable 
economic advance; their partisan opponents, such as Jefferson and 
Jackson, labeled themselves Democrats (and in the latter case even 
called his assembled supporters “the Democracy”) and eventually 
shut down the Bank of the United States in the 1830s, so that the 
U.S. had a largely unregulated banking system until the creation of 
the Federal Reserve in 1913.
The U.S. did not have a central bank from 1836 until the advent 
of the Federal Reserve just prior to the first World War. After the 
Civil War, when America began to become the world’s greatest 
industrial power, “Great Britain served as the premier banker to 
American railways and factories, powering the country’s economic 
growth at a time when American finance could not have managed 
the feat alone” (Chernow, 2017, p. 727). During that period, the U.S. 
suffered through recurrent panics, one every 20 years of so— 1837, 
1857, 1873, 1893 and 1907. (Thanks, Andrew Jackson!) For the most 
part, they were addressed by private, rather than public, interven-
tion, such as that of financier J. P. Morgan. In 1907 Morgan led a 
group of New York bankers to pledge large sums of their own 
money to steady the market by injecting liquidity back into the 
market (Ahamed, 2009).18 They did so in the place of the 
independent treasury system, created by Congress in 1846, that 
supposedly managed the federal government’s money supply 
through the U.S. Treasury until 1913, but by 1907 it was recognized 
that it was ineffectual and sometimes counterproductive, often 
allowing revenue surpluses to accumulate and thus tightening 
credit.
plausible interpretation. Like most good criticism, it was at first vexing. 
While something approaching a binary opposition— a dramatic and 
dynamic opposing tension— may be generally the case as regards state 
oversight and regulation, it is much more complex than that politically 
and ideological coalition formation is a political phenomenon that draws 
from groups with different beliefs. To the extent that one presents a 
simple binary opposition, one is oversimplifying and misrepresenting 
a complex political process, so I particularly appreciate that the vexing 
question was asked. However, if anyone complains about this article’s 
length, I felt I had to address the question— some of the blame goes to 
the reviewer who asked the question in the first place.
18 Morgan “had lived through more panics than had any other, in 1895 
actually bailing out the United States government itself when it was 
within days of running out of gold and defaulting on its debts to Europe” 
(Ahamed, 2009, pp. 125– 129).
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Still, one can imagine there are some instances in which 
people who operate businesses will want regulation— for, instance, 
wanting banks to be regulated to avoid monetary stability, or 
perhaps, they might want to avoid a “race to the bottom” that leads 
to wages so low that overall demand is insufficient for business 
expansion or a different “race to the bottom” that leads to negative 
externalities and environmental degradation— in the day- to- day 
operations of business oversight and regulation will appear as 
obstacles to implementing needed decisions. This is the source  
of an underlying dynamic tension that surfaces in policy, dis-
course, and ideological positioning.
Whether deliberation is considered a method of democratic- 
will formation or a total theory of democratic society, it will rub 
business the wrong way. Deliberation is time- consuming and has 
to consider all interests; on a deliberative account, identifying 
interests is not as simple and unproblematic as is commonly 
supposed and “the formation of a point of view arises from the give 
and take of reasons [as opposed] to merely ranking preferences.”19 
The impact of profit- seeking enterprises, in contrast, is largely 
actuated by advancing a particular set of interests that are likely to 
conflict with other sets of interests.
As noted previously, Dewey offered two explanations for “the 
devotion of democracy to education.” First, there is a superficial 
one that popular suffrage depends upon an educated population. 
Second, there is a deeper one that goes beyond merely repudiating 
the principle of external authority:
There is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than a form of 
government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint 
communicated experience. [Of the] individuals who participate in an 
interest . . . each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to 
consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, 
[which] is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, 
race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full 
import of their activity.
Dewey also contrasted this to “a group which in its exclusiveness 
shuts out many interests” (Dewey 1916/1997, p. 91– 92).
Democracy in his view fundamentally concerns “the realiza-
tion of a form of social life in which interests are mutually inter-
penetrating, and where progress, or readjustment, is an important 
consideration” (Dewey 1916/1997, p. 91– 92).
For Dewey, to “participate in an interest” is more than a 
transaction— it is a transformative experience, sharply distinct 
from merely following an interest. Varied points of shared common 
interest elevate the recognition of mutual interests to the level of 
the socially inviolate; principles of diversity are emphasized as freer 
interaction between social groups makes change in social habit 
imperative. Thus, there is an antagonism between, on the one side, 
the particularistic interests that drive business practice and its 
aggregated outcomes and, on the other, the communicated 
19 The distinction between will formation or a total theory and the 
quoted phrase comes from personal communications by email with 
Christopher Martin. While I think they were helpful and insightful, I  
am not sure he would hold to those views or the precise phrasing.
experience that arises out of deliberation on shared, overlapping, 
and sometimes conflicting interests.
This is not to deny that there is a general business interest, but 
the motive force comes from a set of parallel particularistic 
interests— a group of enterprises that are seeking to make hay 
while the sun shines and arguing that the sun should be allowed to 
shine into the heretofore closed corners of the public system. The 
general business interest, as it coalesces in leading ideologies, 
emphasizes how the market solves problems and that the solution 
lies in creating entrepreneurial opportunities. At the strategic 
level— at least as embodied in the phrase “creative destruction”— 
the chief method of solving problems is to destroy or dismantle 
first, allowing others to repair or create later.
Whether we conceive of interests as particularistic or delib-
erative is important in that the question we are looking at is how 
business influences those with direct authority over education. On 
the one hand, the general public can come to decisions that are 
influenced by market forces and ideologies. On the other, the three 
specific sources of authority in education are affected by how 
questions are framed in public discourse and how they are 
advanced by the ideological apparatus of the private sector, ranging 
from think tanks and media to foundations and funding 
organizations (apropos of this, see Carey, 1997).
The crucial factor need not be some sort of shadowy coordi-
nation of efforts. While this is hardly absent, the main impetus is 
that there is money to be made, and this draws people in. Narra-
tives incorporating this dynamic motivator have been bandied 
about since at least the 1990s, such as when former Massachusetts 
Governor William Weld told us “the fundamentals are all aligned 
for a great number of people to make a whole lot of money in this 
sector” (Walsh, 2000, p. 13).
Significantly, Weld finished his statement, “and do well by 
doing good.” More significant was the occasion of the statement— 
 a conference in New York “for investors, policy analysts, and others 
interested in the growing business of education.” For those holding 
to conspiracy theories, the conference was cosponsored by Wall 
Street financier Theodore Forstmann, cofounder of the Children’s 
Scholarship Fund, who gave this ideological thumbnail: “A 
monopoly produces a bad product at a high price, and the educa-
tion monopoly in America is no exception to that rule” (Walsh, 
2000, p. 13). Thus, there is a clear perspective, one that identifies 
monopoly with government, not business, and it often makes 
reference to the justification of privatization in the form of school 
vouchers that was suggested by Milton Friedman as long ago as 
1955 (see McEwan & Carnoy, 2000, pp. 213– 239).20 In addition to 
vouchers, other propositions, such as pay- for- performance (aka 
“merit” pay) and charters (a second choice for voucher supporters 
but with support from those such as Joe Nathan, who think 
charters an avenue for school innovation and differentiation), are 
part of a single multistranded discourse that has both a construc-
tive and a destructive (as in “creative destruction”) aspect.
20 Interestingly enough, it has been pursued most vigorously in the 
country most dedicated to Friedman, Chile.
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The flip side is that many commentators on the right descry 
the unions as producer organizations with anticompetitive 
policies. The unions are rent seekers, they say, a remnant of 
socialist and collectivist efforts that must be eliminated. Teachers 
must be like just about everyone else— workers who can be fired at 
will or nearly so. Lieberman (1993, pp. 47– 53), in the forthrightly 
named Public Education: An Autopsy,21 was one of the first to do so.
Others in favor of market- based reforms, such as Chubb and 
Moe, specifically identify “The Root of the Problem” as democratic 
control of schools. In that first chapter of their book, they argued 
that schools are “open systems” and respond to their environments, 
and when that environment is democratic, they do so negatively. 
Since they are democratically controlled entities, schools respond 
to constituents, not consumers; that means parents, making 
choices for their children, have no greater voice than anyone else in 
the community (Chubb & Moe, 1990).
Arguing that parents should have a greater voice is a norma-
tive point— one can argue that as education changes and shapes 
society, then everyone should have a voice. In addition to its 
normative basis, it is also in part a reaction to government control 
of schools that is seen as centralized, bureaucratic, and ineffective 
(for a critique of this second point, see S. R. Glass, 1997).22 Overall, 
Chubb and Moe hold that democracy is essentially coercive, but 
that markets, because they are decentralized, allow parents and 
students the freedom to act as consumers, not as constituents, 
where they will have a more powerful role.
Beyond that, since they believe that bureaucracy imposed by 
democratic principles vitiates the most basic requirements of 
effective organization, Chubb and Moe promoted organizational 
autonomy and school- based management, including autonomy of 
principals and teachers. They claimed that school governance is the 
key variable, “that excessive bureaucracy is the proximate cause of 
problems in the schools, and that politics are the ultimate cause  
21 A case study of Lieberman, as someone who seems to be a “true 
believer” advocate, might be in order. He once ran unsuccessfully  
for the presidency of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), but 
the theme that he developed over time was acute criticism of teacher 
unions— the AFT and the National Education Association (NEA)— for 
standing in the way of needed improvement in our schools, arguing that 
“the teacher unions are in the business to achieve more, not less, favor-
able terms and conditions of employment for teachers.” Other works by 
Lieberman include The Impact of the Taylor Act upon the Governance and 
Administration of Elementary and Secondary Education (1971), City Uni-
versity of New York; Beyond Public Education (1986), Praeger Publisher 
Division of Greenwood Press; The Teachers’ Unions: How the NEA and 
the AFT Sabotage Reform and Hold Students, Parents, Teachers and Tax-
payers Hostage to Bureaucracy (1997), The Free Press; Encounter Books; 
and Teachers Evaluating Teachers: Peer Review and the New Unionism 
(1998), Transaction Publishers.
22 Based on extensive interviews, S. R. Glass (1997) “challenge[s] over-
simplified assertions that differences of any importance exist between 
the autonomy experienced by professionals in public and private high 
schools . . . and challenges the myth that teachers and principals in pri-
vate schools enjoy autonomy and freedom from democratic bureaucracy 
that their public school counterparts do not” (p. 1).
of the over- reliance on [a] bureaucracy [that] cannot be changed 
unless the underlying political structure is changed” and “therefore 
recommend that the present system of public school governance be 
scrapped in favor of a market- driven one in which parents have 
primary control over the schools” (G. V. Glass & Matthews, 1991, 
pp. 24– 27).
Chubb and Moe further emphasized not only that organiza-
tional autonomy is related to high achievement but that differences 
in student achievement are due to differences in organizational 
autonomy.23 So they welcomed the autonomy that the market 
supposedly brings but also indicated that autonomy requires a 
reworking of labor relations.
But what if Chubb and Moe are wrong? What if student 
achievement is a result of, for instance, high- quality parent 
involvement? Then the direction of causality would be something 
like (1) parent involvement, (2) high student achievement,  
(3) bureaucracies see no need to intervene, and, therefore,  
(4) school autonomy is a result of other factors. The fact of school 
autonomy would then be an epiphenomenon caused by the quality 
of parental involvement, and efforts to increase school autonomy 
might then be misguided. In this regard, it is important— at least as 
an illustration— to consider charter schools as a type of 
intervention, especially as they are concentrated in areas of lower 
achievement and greater poverty. Poor performance, somehow 
measured, becomes an invitation for intervention and, as it turns 
out, intervention of a particular type.24
We need to see this in context. Whatever the form of gover-
nance, that still leaves the question of whether administrators or 
classroom teachers have the most influence. It is not only that 
autonomy requires a reworking of labor relations but that it needs a 
reworking of labor relations with enormous consequences. In a 
market system— for that is the context— you have to think that in 
most cases the boss is the boss and teacher autonomy is not likely 
to be robust. Here, the business logics tend to converge on the 
23 The direction of causality is not certain, however. While Chubb  
and Moe claimed they both established a correlation, their argument  
that it is autonomy that leads to achievement is hardly solid. It  
could be the other way around, that autonomy follows achievement,  
that is, that schools with higher- achieving students may be granted  
more freedom, and those with lower achieving students may invite more 
interventions in their operations. Chubb and Moe both admitted this as 
a possibility— “organization may be both cause and effect”— and then 
somewhat unconvincingly dismissed it:
Despite all we have said about the problem of reciprocal causal-
ity, we believe that the key influences on student achievement 
tend to run in one direction. We believe that school control 
affects school organization more than the other way around, 
and that school organization is primarily a cause of student 
achievement and not a result of it. (Chubb & Moe, 1990, 
pp. 113, 114)
For the original of this analysis, see G. V. Glass & Matthews, 1991, 
pp. 24– 27.
24 For a list of recommendations for other types of intervention, see 
Morsy and Rothstein, 2015.
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issues of public- versus- private enterprise and collective 
bargaining.
While not necessarily its most representative example, Chubb 
and Moe (1990) are still part of a pattern in which poor 
performance in a small subset of schools is used to justify a massive 
change. While their school autonomy model seems to be at odds 
with an accountability regime based on an extensive system of 
tests, data collection, and accountability, they can be mutually 
reenforcing. The metric by which schools are judged to be per-
forming well or not is largely determined by the accountability 
regime; even if it shared by the public and private sectors, there is 
also a bureaucracy, a newly shaped one with different goals and 
measures. The goals are less about equity, more about achievement 
and performance; the measures are the metrics by which we gauge 
achievement and performance. As Slavin (1999) noted, since the 
early 1980s school reform has been constant and “the main focus of 
reform has been on school governance and [emphasis added] 
accountability” (p. 325).
Yes, there is a pattern: first, point out “poor performance” and 
argue that the public system does not work; second, draw off some 
funding from public enterprise; third, make funds available to 
private- sector entities with projects that will remake the public 
system and purportedly solve its problems. And there are 
coordinated efforts, such as attacking school performance, 
insisting on “accountability,” instituting regularly administrated 
standardized tests, changing curricula and standards, and altering 
evaluation methods. Still, it is not the coordination of one single 
unified campaign that leads to the discounting of the liberal values 
of democratic education but the aggregation of many smaller 
efforts that see those values as obstacles.
What gives the movement much of its force is that, in count-
less instances, the business outcome has priority over democratic 
imperatives. This is the common sense of business, and it emanates 
from people engaged in largely parallel efforts. Market- based 
systems succeed because they benefit people— at least those people 
who successfully navigate the market. A significant portion 
involves clever young men (and some women) pursing 
opportunities to dismantle the public sector or peel certain parts 
away, thus allowing for- profit entities to enter the field. And if the 
democratic goals of education get in the way of that, then let’s just 
not pay attention to them.25
25 This is directly related to the decline of civics education. As regards 
this, we will not go into it in any depth, but it is a well- worn topic, and 
multiple authors have descried the decline of civics education. Some 
recent examples:
• “Civic knowledge and public engagement is at an all- time 
low” (Shapiro & C. Brown, 2018).
• After the 1960s, “civics offerings were slashed as the 
curriculum narrowed over the ensuing decades, and lost 
further ground to ‘core subjects’ under the NCLB- era 
standardized testing regime” (Litvinov, 2017).
• “For at least half a century America’s schools have 
systematically failed to prepare students to be capable 
citizens” (Rebell, 2018).
Neoliberal Ideology, The Public Will, and Organized Opposition
The task of creating a public will for a unified public school system 
is daunting. It is even more so when there is organized opposition. 
And there is.
Without invoking some level of organized opposition, one 
cannot accurately frame many of these business interventions. 
There are reform movements that promote market- based models 
of education and/or reform efforts centered on the emulation of 
market mechanism. This is not only in the United States— Pasi 
Sahlberg, former director general of Finland’s CIMO (of the 
Ministry of Education and Culture) in Helsinki, has termed it  
the Global Education Reform Movement (GERM).
Nonetheless, I am emphasizing ideas over organization 
because these interventions gain traction more readily if there is a 
shared set of beliefs— such as “the common sense of business” 
referred to previously— and if there are numerous, parallel sources. 
This is evident in U.S. public education, where market- emulation 
models seek to divert efforts to create a unified public school 
system and substitute in its place a patchwork of charters, vouchers 
for private schools, online education, home schooling, virtual 
schools, and public schools based on market emulation models.26 
These are all separate economic opportunities and have somewhat 
different motivating forces, but they share some significant 
common features.
Education reform largely based on market- driven economic 
forces is a global phenomenon and should be considered as part of 
a neoliberal movement that can be dated back to the late 1960s and 
the 1970s.27 Neoliberalism holds generally that poor economic 
performance is due to state interference in the market mechanism. 
Amounting to a type of market fundamentalism, neoliberalism 
seeks to change the relationships between state and society; four 
• “We need to ask whether schools are equipping students 
with the tools to become engaged, informed, and 
compassionate citizens” (Hansen et al., 2018).
• “There is abundant evidence of an abysmally low level 
of understanding of the constitution, our system of 
government, and American history in general. . . . Many 
Americans profess, or at least did when the question 
was asked in surveys from 1968 through 2000 that 
the ‘civic mission of schools is an essential— if not the 
essential— purpose of education.’ The centrality of a civic 
mission appears dubious in light of the recent focus on 
training and testing in STEM courses” (Folz & Dodd, 
2014).
See also Ward, 2014.
26 For the purposes of this article, I will not attempt to establish this but 
will take it as a given. The literature on this is immense; for a review of 
much of it, emphasizing the misuse of statistics and quantitative studies, 
see Ford, 2012. Other sources are in other footnotes.
27 The term “neoliberalism” was, however, coined long before, by 
economists and legal scholars affiliated with the Freiberg School of the 
University of Freiberg in Baden- Württemberg, Germany, in the interwar 
period (Steger & Roy, 2010, p. ix).
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relevant features are privatization, financialization, management 
and manipulation of crisis, and state redistributions.28
Increased corporate power, commodification, and privatiza-
tion are, according to Harvey (2006), and many others, part of the 
neoliberal project. Thus, privatization, in whole or in part, is 
applied to public institutions (ranging from prisons to universities) 
and public utilities (such as water, electricity, and transportation); 
it has even changed the structure of warfare through the use of 
private contractors. In the U.S., regulations on telecommunications 
have been largely removed, and social welfare provisions (such as 
housing, health care, pensions) have been reformed in accordance 
with market models.
Neoliberal ideology . . . aligns the concept of free markets with 
individual freedom, laissez fare, and the individual entrepreneur with 
classical liberalism [and then] goes beyond classical liberalism by 
embracing market fundamentalism since it is believed in neoliberal 
ideology that society is a market where “every human being is an 
entrepreneur managing their own life, and should act as such.” (Kabir, 
2013, quoting Treanor, 2005, as cited in Prechel & Harms, 2007, p. 4)
Applying such a view to education would obviously have a huge 
impact, emphasizing not the student as a deliberative political 
citizen but as a multifaceted economic agent— worker, investor, 
and consumer.
The political aspect of neoliberalism is drawn primarily from 
Hayek and Friedman, both of whom argued for individual 
economic freedom that would, by extension, also apply to busi-
nesses, including corporations, functioning in the market. 
(Whether Smith [1776], given his fears regarding “conspiracies 
against the public and contrivances to raise prices” [book I, 
chapter X] and having little experience with corporations, would 
agree is an open question.) In a neoliberal policy agenda, market- 
driven economic forces are the key factor in determining the goals 
of the education system, emphasizing how each student must 
become an economic entity, either by getting a job or by starting a 
business. Students, while they are still biding their time in school, 
are considered to be consumers, buying a product that will enable 
their economic futures.
One thing left out is the production of citizens or, if you will, 
deliberative democrats. This was Gutmann’s topic, and by looking 
at her three sources of authority— the state, parents, and 
educational professionals— we see how this movement has worked. 
In order to examine these models, we will use Gutmann’s work as a 
heuristic device to interpret business- influenced movements to 
reform public education. This involves the fit between the infusion 
of ideology “from above,” so to speak, and the strategies of business 
built from the ground up.
Proxies for Children, a Purported Insight, and Changed 
Questions: Agendas, Authority, and Influence
Why should not the business community also be considered a 
source of authority?
28 The list comes from Harvey, 2006. See also Prechel and Harms, 2007, 
pp. 3– 17. For the manipulation of crisis, see Klein, 2007.
First, a bit more personal background. This paper is an 
elaboration of an insight, and I think it is worth going into the 
background. In 2012, when I was living in India, I reviewed galleys 
for my soon- to- be published book on U.S. education, the subtitle 
of which fairly describes its theme, The Rhetoric Gap and How 
Research on Schools has Laid the Ground for New Business Models in 
Education. The draft had been finished while I was still in the U.S., 
but after the proofs came out, I had a chance to made final changes.
One proposed addition was a thought I had about Gutmann’s 
work, particularly the three sources of authority she posited for 
education: the state, parents, and educational professionals. Why, I 
thought at the time, should the business community, which had 
great influence, not also be considered a source of authority? 
Certainly, much of what was embedded in new education reform 
proposals were based on an economistic common sense. Such were 
the underlying principles of a neoliberal reform: Competition  
is the way to efficiency; successful schools would multiply while 
failing schools should be closed down; business practices can be 
imported into the education system to great effect; an entrepre-
neurial ethos can guide the system’s development.
I wrote a few paragraphs, but they were not included in the 
book since they went beyond the 5% that, by contract, I was 
allowed to add. (In this case, the marketplace of ideas was limited 
by marketing concerns.) Still, the question remained as how 
business had as much influence as it did when it did not have direct 
authority.
I want to stress that it is the latter question I am exploring.  
I am not asking why Gutmann (1987) did not include business 
influence in her work. Some readers of earlier versions have 
suggested that I sought “to demolish” Gutmann, but that was by no 
means the point. It seems fairly clear why business would not have 
been included in Gutmann’s work as a source of authority. First, 
business is from a different sphere and does not have a custodial 
relation with children. Second, business influence was not nearly as 
great as it later became.
Yes, Gutmann’s (1987) work could certainly be seen in a much 
different light— perhaps many different lights— because of how 
education reform has unfolded since she wrote the book in  
the 1980s. Neoliberalism and business influence do change the 
problematic, and it might very well be that the relationship 
between democracy and education has to be rethought in an era in 
which technology has enabled a new type of globalization that has 
the potential to undercut democratic efforts at the national level. 
While it would have to engage with the question I am posing, that 
sort of reworking of the theory of democratic education— a 
reevaluation of its underpinnings under changed 
circumstances— is a task that is beyond me.
Rather, this piece seeks to answer another question: How have 
business and investor classes achieved a large measure of success in 
advancing their agenda in education? How can we track their 
influence? They answer to that is, of course, partly to be had from 
identifying and tracking their superior resources, but even that has 
not given them direct authority over education. Instead, what 
business- influenced education reform has done to gain influence is 
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to change the questions that the three sources of authority seek to 
answer.
For the state, educational purpose has narrowed, and political 
citizenship has changed to economic competency. The question 
has changed from “how to create proper democratic citizens who 
can someday participate in national deliberations?” to “how to 
serve customers so they can some day navigate the changing eddies 
and currents of the global market?”
For parents, they have been co- opted; rather than partners in 
developing and maintaining educational institutions, they have 
become consumers. Their question has changed from “how to 
contribute to a collective effort to build a fair, equitable, and 
high- quality school system?” to “how do I make the best choice for 
my child among the educational options laid before them by a 
system based on choice?”
For educators, they have been marginalized and subjected to 
attack. The question has changed from “how can I seek out from 
administrators what I need to enable me to teach?” to “how can I 
avoid being blamed for the failures that the system is now intent on 
spotlighting?”
Continuing with Gutmann’s (1987) sources of authority, all 
three serve as proxies for children in different ways. Proxies are 
needed for children because of their age and their stage of cogni-
tive, emotional, intellectual, and political development; they are 
not thought capable of making informed choices (C. Martin, 2018). 
This depiction of competing proxies does a lot to explain educa-
tional discourse by looking at the three groups that at some point 
have custody over or a compelling interest in the welfare of the 
child— the parents (in general), the school (in locus parentis), and 
the state (in extreme conditions enforcing community and legal 
standards).
These three sources balance and check each other in different 
and important ways. First, the state seeks to shape individuals so as 
to serve state purposes— in war, agriculture, industry, technology, 
governance, etc. It may also seek to fulfill an ideological vision of 
what a society should be and how individuals would be accord-
ingly shaped by the educational system. This might be deemed  
the ethical content of the state— ideas that vary according to the 
cultural specificities of a particular state and society. In using this 
as its justification, the state can call on parents and educators to 
comply with established norms.
Second, similarly, parents often work to impart ethical 
content and to transmit cultural traditions, to leave a legacy of their 
own, and to have a sense of satisfaction in seeing their children 
become independent adults. As participants in discourse and 
voting, they have an impact on who state actors are and what state 
actors can deem legitimate. Third, those who actually engage in 
education out of the home, as their profession, their calling, or 
both, draw on both theory and practice to make the claim that they 
know— or at least have a more informed perception of— what  
is best for the child and for the future individual the child will 
become. Plus, whatever the theory and directives for education  
are, they must be implemented, and it is educators who will 
implement them.
Accordingly, all three may be proxies for children. Since 
children do have limited capacities when compared to adults, the 
argument is that they would likely benefit from having a proxy who 
is both honest and insightful. That does not mean, however, that 
the proxies don’t have their own agendas or that trustees or proxies 
can be trusted fully. While it is an issue that cannot be considered 
fully here, we ought to remember there are two meanings to 
trust— one based on intent, the other on capacity. I may trust my 
brother with my life, but I won’t have him fix my roof since he does 
not know the first thing about construction or carpentry. Good 
intentions or not, the roof is likely to fall in.29
Still, by looking at the conflicts between these three sources of 
authority, one can do a lot. Gutmann (1987), as a theoretical 
project, argued that none of them are sufficient unto themselves; 
thus, a democracy and the system of democratic education on 
which it relies must achieve a balance among the three. In practical 
and empirical terms, one can look at how issues arise from one 
source of authority or another and how actors in the three spheres 
interact to explain outcomes on policy issues ranging from school 
funding to sex education to prayer in schools.
What the depiction of three sources of authority does not do, 
however, is explain the rise of one of the most powerful influencers 
of education reform over the last four decades: business. Business 
influence differs in many ways from the three sources listed 
previously, but in particular it differs in that it has not normally 
been thought to have direct authority over education. Unlike the 
other three, business is not usually a custodial actor, the rare 
exceptions being in those cases where schools are run as for- profit 
entities, and these only account for a very small percentage of 
minor students in K– 12 settings.
Just as it does not have direct custody, business has a different 
conception of trust. In The Logic and Limits of Trust (1983), Barber 
spoke of how business espouses and wants others to embrace “the 
indirect road.” He described it as follows:
29 The discussion on “trusting in intent” versus “trusting in 
capacity” hardly ends there, either.
On the issue of intent, it is not clear that people would take their 
trustee role seriously. After all, they might just feel that now they have 
two votes, and it is thus open to misuse. It is hardly clear even in the case 
of parents that they would treat this proxy vote differently from their 
own— a proxy should be concerned with the interests of the individual 
for whom they are proxies.
Even more vexing is the issue of capacity: Could the trustee proxies 
actually know the preferences of those whose votes they hold in trust? 
Could they be able to predict which vote will lead to the greatest good for 
those whose votes they hold in trust?
Overall, we have two worries: How seriously do they take their own 
role as a proxy voter? How informed are they? In a brief argument, we 
can draw on the work of Bernard Barber (1983) on trust. Barber treats 
trust as a complex notion in which expectations of future performance 
vie with beliefs in good intentions. Accordingly, I argue elsewhere that 
one way of describing the paradigm shift in education is to say there has 
been a shift in the mode of trust from models based on family, political, 
and philanthropic spheres to a model based on business interactions.
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Social control over service to the public welfare is assigned not to 
public expectations of direct fiduciary obligations and their 
fulfillment, but to the indirect competitive mechanisms of the market. 
That is, the profit incentive, operating through the market, will ensure 
indirectly that businesses effectively serve the public good. (Barber, 
p. 101)
Moreover, while the state, parents, and educators all have 
agendas of their own, they are thought secondary to their interests 
in the well- being of the student. Perhaps this is an optimistic view, 
but they nonetheless contrast with the profit- seeking motives of 
those engaged in business; these are primary, and their agenda is 
more obvious. While a parent’s agenda might be to want a child to 
be educated to make the parent’s life easier, to advance their own 
careers, or to make their life more secure (for instance, by doing 
tasks around the home, by working in a family business or on a 
family farm, or by eventually taking care of aged parents), there are 
limits on this, limits, for instance, that educators would articulate 
and that the state might impose if a child was taken out of school.30
Similarly, if educators are self- interested, parents and the state 
could potentially step in; indeed, such accusations have been a 
prominent way of attacking teachers and teachers unions, claiming 
they do not put “children first.” Finally, if the state inculcated  
a culture that was directed only to the state’s interests, such as a 
military culture, this would generally (with perhaps the exceptions 
of ancient Sparta and Plato’s imagined Republic) result in at least 
some resistance from parents and educators; most parents do not 
want their children to be cannon fodder, and many educators have 
qualms about recommending their students enter the military.
Gutmann (1987) discussed why all three sources are insuffi-
cient by themselves early in the book; without looking at self- 
interested agendas, she found them wanting nonetheless. None of 
these can stand alone. The family state is unacceptable because it 
forbids parents from influencing their children’s upbringing. The 
state of families is unacceptable because children need some liberty 
vis- à- vis their parents. The state of individuals is unacceptable 
because it keeps us from teaching virtues or inculcating children 
with visions of the good life (pp. 26– 37).
Business, however, is of questionable standing for multiple 
reasons. Business cannot operate without profits or “margins” (at 
least not for long). Traditionally, it does not have direct authority 
over children. In some schemas, businesses are in a different sphere 
altogether— not the sphere of reproduction but instead the sphere 
30 For a few years I was one of the managers of a residence for 
developmentally challenged adults in the Boston area. One of the 
residents, I will call her Tessa, was taken out of school after the fifth 
grade and kept at home in order to do cleaning and cooking. While Tessa 
was certainly challenged to some degree, my opinion was that if she had 
the opportunity to get an education, she would have been able to lead a 
life much like anyone else’s. While I don’t imagine that special education 
programs were robust at the time, and that may well have contributed 
to her parent’s decision, Tessa was more challenged emotionally than 
cognitively; her absence from school, lack of rudimentary skills, and lack 
of socialization were the greater factors leading to her need to be in a 
supported setting.
of production.31 Nonetheless, business has effects— it channels 
liberty into a particular vision of the good life; it affects how 
parents influence their children; it treats educators as instruments.
While business does not have direct authority over education, 
the indirect influence of business and investor classes has been 
enormous, making the question of how to track it quite pressing. 
One way is to, in the well- worn phrase, follow the money.32 Yes, 
businesses can and do lobby government; businesses can start and 
have started chains of private or charter schools. Also, businesses 
can and do produce educational products, ranging from textbooks 
and curricula to data systems, standardized tests, and computer- 
assisted instruction; businesses can and do enter into public 
discourse; businesses can and do start foundations and give money 
to educational institutions; and businesses can and do support 
educational alternatives, but they affect the project of public education 
indirectly.
Another way, which does not preclude the first, is to focus on 
the sources of authority in education and how they are influenced. 
Businesses are not one of the three primary sources of authority 
and traditionally do not exercise authority directly. Rather, they 
have a secondary authority or what may be thought of as a medi-
ated influence. Each of the three primary sources of authority is 
influenced indirectly by framing the question of how to provide 
public education in a particular way so as to redirect one of the 
primary sources.
Three core examples are the standards movement, school 
choice, and attacks on educators. These illustrate a paradigm 
change in the provision of education. First, we have the standards 
movement (which morphed into the Common Core) seeking to 
redirect state attention from the civic components of education  
to the “rigor” of core academic subjects (especially mathematics, 
English language, and scientific technical subjects), which include 
the key skills needed by business, leaving the “richness” of art, 
music, and literature in the second string.
Second, we have an accompanying shift from considering 
students as future citizens to considering them contemporary 
consumers and future workers or entrepreneurs. The first takes the 
form of school choice, in which parental authority is redirected 
from the provision of public education to the selection among 
different existing public education and publicly funded education 
options. Along with this is a switch from considering students as 
participants in democracy to preparing them primarily for 
economic roles; citizenship becomes, primarily, economic 
citizenship.
31 The state also may be said to be in a different and third sphere— the 
sphere of coercion, since it controls the legitimate means of coercion. 
However, that is not its only function, and it is also in most cases the 
leading apparatus through which a human community implements 
collective decisions, including establishing a school system.
32 One often follows the money through foundations, such as the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Walton Family Foundation, and the 
Broad Foundation. See Reckhow, 2012. See also Ravitch, 2010. If I recall 
correctly, she also uses the phrase “follow the money.”
democracy & education, vol 28, no- 1  feature article 16
Finally, and related to this, there are direct attacks on the 
quality and motives of professional educators, attacking “bad” 
teachers as the cause of educational failures and attacking teachers 
unions as distributional coalitions that protect the incompetent; 
accompanying this has been a change in teacher evaluation, 
including using standardized tests to gauge the effectiveness of 
teachers and introducing new rubrics for observation in the 
classroom.33
I will try to unpack that sometime, but it is important to note 
that there is a common element linking all three: testing. Tests are 
not the only factor, but they were at the core of the model of 
standardized tests and a system of data collection. Testing is how 
we determine if children meet their standards. Testing is how we 
assess school success and failure and which schools stay open and 
which ones close. Testing is how teachers are evaluated— do they 
increase their students’ scores?— how teachers might earn “merit 
pay,” and how teachers are promoted or fired.
Contrasting Perspectives on Testing Regimes, Productivity, 
and Creativity
If we accept that there has been a paradigm change— or at least a 
contestation of how the paradigm should change— we should start 
with testing.34 Testing is central to contemporary education reform 
in the same way caffeine is central to choosing among types of 
coffee. There are different views on how testing should be used just 
as people differ over how much of a jolt their coffee should give 
them. There are those who advocate testing as the essential element 
33 Henry Giroux (2012), Ken Saltman (2012), Diane Ravitch (2010), 
Alex Means (2013), Richard Rothstein (2010a, 2010b), and many others 
have highlighted attacks on teachers as central to the educational reforms 
promoted and financed by the mega wealthy, such as Bill Gates, Rupert 
Murdoch, and Eli Broad. These reforms promote privatization, charters, 
online classes, and high- stakes testing, but the flip side of this is depro-
fessionalization. Teacher autonomy is reduced or eliminated; teacher 
training is thought unimportant; teachers unions are denigrated as mere 
distributional coalitions, at the same time impugning the character and 
the unions that support them.
34 While this paper considers the neoliberal period, from the mid- 
1970s (or even the late 1960s) to the present, with special emphasis on 
the use of standardized testing beginning in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
one might nevertheless easily connect this to the arguments between 
pedagogical and administrative progressives from the 1920s onward. 
The latter “sought to apply a top- down model where expert bureaucrats 
ran schools seeking social and economic efficiency [with] a primary 
focus on organizational performance and aggressive ‘uniform’ goals 
(high- stakes tests, evaluation rubrics, and standards),” while the former 
pursued “student- centered learning approaches” informed by theories of 
cognitive development. For a brief summary with exciting illustrations,  
see the source of the quotes, Heilig, 2013. I would note, however, 
that there are significant differences, especially in that administrative 
progressives followed a statist model, not a market- emulation 
model. That is to say, they were concerned with organizational issues 
and operations protocols, not entrepreneurial ethos and market 
emulation— it was a different species of capitalism. Moreover, many 
advocates of charters (e.g., J. Nathan) have strong arguments to make on 
pedagogical, organizational culture, and developmentalist grounds.
in an accountability regime, and those who worry that testing takes 
away from higher educational aims.
No one disputes, however, that beginning in the 1980s, there 
was an effort to evaluate educational outcomes by using 
standardized tests.35 The watchword was accountability. According 
to Klees (2014), “the emphasis was on narrow views of efficiency 
more than equity, implemented through narrow versions of 
accountability focused on testing and measurement.” This was in 
sharp contrast with “the 1960s and 1970s, [when] there was 
attention focused on the inequities and inequalities of education, 
the marginalization of many people around the world, and the 
need for substantially more resources to be devoted to all levels of 
education.” He compared this with the post- 1980s period when 
neoliberalism became ascendant and “led to a sea change in 
discourse and policy. . . Basic problems of public schools have been 
ignored; instead, policies promoted market solutions through 
private schools, vouchers, charters, and the like” (pp. 13).
There was also activity from government agencies, founda-
tions, and universities. The University of Pittsburgh, for instance, 
started a New Standards Project™ in which the phrase “New 
Standards™” was trademarked (Ford, 2012, p. xxxi). While no single 
set of national tests was ever created, almost every state had 
statewide, high- stakes tests by the end of the 1990s, and this was 
encouraged at the federal level. After 2002, the George W. Bush 
administration formalized this leverage with the No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB) program. NCLB called for annual testing of all 
students in English language (but not so much literature) and math 
from grades three through eight, with plans for expansion to 
science and to other grade levels.
While the expansion plans were never met and the Obama 
administration rolled back some aspects of NCLB, one must note 
that support for testing was bipartisan. Then Senator Edward 
Kennedy was key to getting NCLB passed in 2002. Also, despite 
referring to NCLB as broken, Obama Secretary of Education  
Arne Duncan used the law as a leveraging instrument, giving states 
waivers to NCLB only after they agreed to implement some pet 
policies, such as creating more charter schools (thus expanding 
school choice) and using student test scores in teacher 
evaluations.36
Perhaps the most prevalent bipartisan element is what seems 
to be the underlying theme of the neoliberal era: Schools are 
failures, and it is the fault of teachers. Illustrative is the NCLB 
35 As I argue in Social Learning and Hegemony, data technologies made 
this qualitatively different than other such attempts, but it was hardly  
the first time testing in the U.S. was controversial. See Kaestle, 2012; 
Reese, 2013; and Gould, 1981.
36 In 2015, Duncan said NCLB “has long been broken. We can no longer 
afford that law’s one- size- fits- all approach, uneven standards, and low 
expectations for our educational system” (Miller, 2015).
Prior to that, he had, however, used the waiver process to require 
states to create more privately managed charter schools and to tie mea-
sures of student growth to teacher evaluations. See for instance, Brill, 
2011, pp. 227– 233; Derthick and Rotherham, 2012; Ravitch, 2012; and 
Emma, 2013.
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system of deeming schools “failing” and then closing them down if 
they did not sufficiently improve. Also prominent is Democrats for 
Education Reform (DFER), a New York– based political action 
committee with its roots in “the data- driven business community” 
(Maranto & McShane, 2012). DFER promotes use of more charter 
schools, alternative school funding, an end to tenure, stricter 
teacher evaluations, standardized testing, and the Common Core 
educational standards. It has been highly influential, and it has 
been posited that Duncan’s elevation to secretary of education over 
Linda Darling- Hammond, Obama’s education transition chief, was 
indicative of their influence.37
Public asset privatization and the importation of business 
practices were normalized during the Obama presidency. Calling 
“reform” a misnomer, Ravitch (2013) argued both that the “corpo-
rate reform movement,” with its close ties to the Obama adminis-
tration, in fact “has its roots in an ideology that is antagonistic to 
public education” and that “the advocates for this cause seek not to 
reform public education but to transform it into an entrepreneurial 
sector of the economy” (p. 20, p. 19).
There were certain efforts to raise caps on the number of 
charter schools. Janelle Scott has identified an “emerging charter 
school policy- planning network” in which the “federal Depart-
ment of Education, state legislatures, and philanthropies and 
private foundations have facilitated much of the growth of charter 
schools in urban school districts through their investment in 
charter school management organizations (CMOs) and through 
their investments in sundry advocacy organizations” (Scott, 2015, 
p. 132).38
Perhaps more important, large sums of money were dedi-
cated to building data systems to keep track of test scores, to link 
teachers to their students’ test results, and to fund merit pay 
programs based on that link (Ravitch, 2010, p. 183). Duncan’s chief 
of staff, Joanne Weiss, laid out for the readers of the Harvard 
37 During the Bush- to- Obama transition, Darling- Hammond was 
considered the principal adviser to the Obama transition team. 
Nonetheless, Duncan, who had long known President Obama both 
in Chicago and on the basketball court, was chosen as secretary 
of education. But it wasn’t just their personal association; DFER 
founders— Whitney Tilson, Boykin Curry, and John Petry, all hedge fund 
“value investors”— recommended Duncan (Brill, 2011, pp. 223– 225). 
This was of major significance: Darling- Hammond was a great 
proponent of an institution building model, while, according to Giroux 
and Saltman (2008), Duncan saw that neoliberal methods had a place 
in the real worlds of political and economic competition; with Arne 
Duncan, they said, “neoliberal ideology is on full display in the various 
connections he has established with the ruling political and business 
elite.” While Darling- Hammond was a strong advocate of building up 
a highly qualified teaching force (for her viewpoints on teachers, see 
Darling- Hammond, “Teacher Quality and Student Achievement,” as 
cited in J. K. Rice, 2003, pp. 2– 3), Duncan used elements of market 
emulation models, including new evaluation systems for teachers, that, 
while calling NCLB “broken,” built on both its underlying principles and 
its methods, especially the use of leverage to get states to adopt U.S. DOE 
reforms. See for instance, Bracey, 2009; Klein, Hoff, and Gewertz, 2008.
38 Scott referenced Zehr (2011).
Business Review how “the market for education technology is likely 
to accelerate” and entrepreneurs needed to be matched with school 
systems, including enabling “data- driven culture in their schools 
that depended on a formative assessment regimen” (Weiss, 2011).
Moreover, in February 2010, President Obama took a stand in 
favor of closing low- performing schools that was straight from the 
DFER playbook. He defended the firing of all 93 school employees 
at Central Falls High School in Rhode Island because the school 
had failed to measure up. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan 
praised the courage of those who made the decision. Whatever 
courage they displayed, they seemed to ignore that the majority of 
school failures are in areas of concentrated poverty and that 
student achievement is highly correlated to the educational 
attainment and economic level of one’s parents (Ford, 2012, pp. 81, 
100, 124; see also Goldstein, 2011).
Yes, there are direct actions, but for the most part, it can be 
described as “the natural state” in a market system where people 
and groups pursue their interests largely independently. Again, a 
question that arises is whether this is somehow a plot— a grand 
conspiracy. If we mean that the major players meet in smoke- filled 
rooms, then the answer is again most likely no. If we mean that  
the players talked with one another or read the same materials, the 
answer is often yes. But that is not the main point. This is not meant 
to be a criticism of conspiratorial business actions but of pervasive 
business influence, and that influence comes not only from 
foundations and individuals seeking to alter the system but in 
largest part from the entrepreneurial opportunities offered by 
opening up the system. Thus, when we look at these reforms, we 
don’t have to preclude the presence of good intentions, but we do 
have to understand that the dynamic forces come from the promise 
of future profits:
Some sincerely believe they are helping poor black and brown children 
escape from failing public schools. Some think they are on the side of 
modernization and innovation . . . others see an opportunity to make 
money in a large, risk- free, government- funded sector or an 
opportunity for personal advancement and power. Some— a small but 
important number— believe they are acting rationally by treating the 
public education sector as an investment opportunity (Ravitch, 2013, 
p. 20.).39
Business may seem to be a nonspecific term, but the vague-
ness disappears when we ask the question “What does one learn in 
business school?” Though they have their effects, we are not talking 
about the infusion of capitalist ideologies justifying the system as a 
whole but rather the practices one must adopt to remain 
39 Again, it is worth pointing out that ideological coalition formation 
draws from groups with different beliefs who converge: true believ-
ers who firmly believe that research shows that we should adopt these 
measures to improve the system; political actors who want to adopt 
these positions for political advantage; and those who see the adoption 
as advantaging them economically. This is, of course, just the crudest of 
thumbnail sketches, but one important in understanding the formation 
of ideological and strategic positions, where they come from, how they 
develop, and how they interact over time.
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competitive. In other words, it is first about strategies— ideologies 
are secondary. People in business internalize the principles and 
practices that characterize a private market economy and can 
justify their being applied to the pursuit of the public good.
Business approaches to education do dovetail with a privatiza-
tion ideology, including the promotion of public- private partner-
ships, but still it is about strategy:
[I]deas from business and business leaders have been marketed as 
important to the improvement of education . . . Sometimes this entire 
business- oriented approach is subsumed under the heading of “new 
public management.” . . . School district superintendents and 
university presidents are now called chief executive officers, and too 
often are selected with a business background instead of an education 
one. And, most common, is that task forces and commissions on 
education routinely give pride of place to business executives, as if 
business strategies translate to education strategies. (Klees, 2014, 
p. 144)40
We also see the increased use of terms that are business- 
oriented, such as “best practices,” even if we cannot know that they 
are really the best as opposed to being merely preferred by a select 
group. “Best practices” are a mixed bag at best and can include, as I 
can attest as a teacher who gets a lot of them, your assistant 
supervisors sending out multiple group emails that cheerily begin, 
“Hey, Team!”
Still, this is not a conspiracy; rather, it is something one should 
expect. Just as a simple matter of backward planning, if someone 
has an economistic perspective, then they are most likely interested 
in efficiency, competition, and comparative advantage and, 
consequently, would likely support as a public good a program that 
produces strong- minded and capable economic actors who can 
navigate the market.
Consider these contingencies:
First, if you had a list of imperatives for education that are 
developed with the goal of allowing for some sort of 
egalitarianism— at least in so much as a person’s talents would be 
recognized and nurtured.
Second, if this list had been developed by looking at the 
possible ways in which the pursuit of profits may produce undesir-
able social consequences, including the concentration of power, 
and if this list also seeks to create a democratic citizen who 
considers the general good, balancing it with their individual 
interests.
Third, if education were thought of, at least in part, as a way of 
balancing out the inequitable (economic, social, and perhaps even 
natural inequities).
If you had all these things, then you would also expect to some 
extent there would be a similar list, with content that was 
40 Klees added, “This is ubiquitous and has given most educators a lot of 
headaches. Primary, secondary, and higher education have suffered from 
the call for business plans, strategic plans, performance budgets, right- 
sizing, impact evaluation, merit pay, and the like. Evaluations of teachers 
have multiplied, usually illegitimately tied to a few very narrow indica-
tors.” (p. 144)
diametrically opposed, derived from other interests and other 
perspectives. The list might assume the lack of egalitarianism was 
not a big problem, that the market would take care of that. It might 
assume that the social consequences of ignoring the profit motive 
are even more undesirable, that the concentration of power allows 
for tough discretionary judgments, and that the appeal to the 
consumer instead of to the citizen advances the interests of the 
individual. It might highlight how education can select individuals 
by merit and let them advance.
Business perspectives most often hold that we set the strong- 
minded and capable economic actors who can navigate the market 
in motion and watch them make change. Equity and social justice 
would be secondary concerns. If, on the one hand, one has a 
perspective that emphasizes democratic practice, one would 
support a program that produces critical and creative 
thinkers— capable democratic actors who, among other things, 
might question the wisdom of constantly following the directions 
in which the market and its incentives take us.
This is not to say these perspectives cannot share some goals. 
While they may very well differ in terms of both social costs and 
how to create a productive system, the two perspectives may 
overlap in many regards, especially in terms of productivity in the 
long run. Presumably creativity and critical thinking skills are 
necessary for both. But, on the other hand, there are differences in 
priority— for one perspective looks for the aggregate and the other 
for the communal, or at least the mutually created.
One can argue that recent American education reform is 
tinged with the irony that it might have been counterproductive, 
even in economic terms (Ford, 2012, pp. 120– 130).41 Since the 1980s, 
reforms were meant to increase economic performance by 
introducing higher standards and promoting accountability 
through the instrument of a testing regime. The results are, 
however, mixed at best— the “standards” movement in the 1980s 
and how it then segued into the data- driven system of assessment 
we have now are of questionable value, but they match fairly well 
with business perspectives on how to train, select, and evaluate 
employees. Of course, in public education, selection is a much 
trickier issue, because we presumably do not want to exclude 
students, but the business perspective still has its effects.
Moreover, business influence is driven by business opportu-
nity. Weiss (2011) pointed out one example directly:
The development of common standards and shared assessments 
radically alters the market for innovation in curriculum development, 
professional development, and formative assessments. Previously, 
these markets operated on a state- by- state basis, and often on a 
district- by- district basis. But the adoption of common standards and 
shared assessments means that education entrepreneurs will enjoy 
national markets where the best products can be taken to scale.
There is a problem, however. By using the word 
“entrepreneur,” Weiss (2011) might be drawing on an image of a 
41 The following several paragraphs are a condensed version, without 
including all the citations or nuances, of the argument in “Achieving 
Creativity” of “Section H: Consider the Hero.”
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garage- incubated start- up or a mom- and- pop shop— and there are 
some examples of those— but taking something to scale requires 
huge resources. So, we end up with McGraw Hill or Pearson 
Education, which labels itself “The world’s learning company.” 
Pearson’s annual revenues tripled, from $2 billion in the early 
2000s to roughly $6 billion in the 2014 fiscal year, and its 
“increasing profits come, in no small part, from the company’s 
continued influence over federal and global education initiatives 
which has led to the wholesale adoption of Pearson’s products in 
nearly every aspect of public education today” (see Attick & Boyles, 
2016, pp. 5– 19).
Meanwhile, the irony is that creativity among youth has 
declined, and education reforms are all over the place. In some 
places, drill- and- kill is adopted as much as problem- based 
learning because the tests are standardized and the answers, many 
believe, can be memorized, at least a lot of them (Kim, 2011). When 
Jonathan Plucker, a U.S. creativity specialist, was asked while 
visiting China to identify trends in American education,  
he described the U.S. focus on standardized curriculum, rote 
memorization, and nationalized testing. “After my answer was 
translated, they just started laughing out loud. They said, ‘You’re 
racing toward our old model. But we’re racing toward your model, 
as fast as we can’” (quoted in Bronson & Merryman, 2010).42
However, while China moves elsewhere and the European 
Union declared a European Year of Creativity and Innovation 
(which involved “holding conferences on the neuroscience of 
creativity, financing teacher training, and instituting problem- 
based learning programs— curricula driven by real- world 
inquiry— for both children and adults” [quoted in Bronson & 
Merryman, 2010]), the U.S. has seemed bent on market model 
reforms and standardized tests of basic skills, neither of which has 
been shown to improve education anywhere else in the world. 
However, outsourcing of assessment through the use of standard-
ized tests fits right in with the market model, so we should not be 
surprised that they go hand- in- hand.
Maybe it is more than irony but a central paradox: Efforts in 
the U.S. over the last 30 years— the national attention on education 
reform as a means to keep the U.S. from slipping in international 
economic competition— seem to have resulted in a system that has 
gotten worse at its core, in its philosophical tenets, and in its 
ultimate effect on children and young adults, placing unwonted 
pressure on them and stifling their creativity and stunting their 
emotional lives. Arguably, it has also made the U.S. less competitive 
economically.43
42 While I have great respect for Plucker, to what extent we are rushing 
to rote memorization is contestable.
43 As noted, this is the summary of an argument I have made elsewhere. 
Some advance readers have suggested it is polemical and unsupported. 
While I admit it is both speculative and on the polemical side, it is 
supported by reference to the literature on creativity as well as a logical 
progression:
 1) Creativity is an important ingredient in economic 
advance;
So, to some extent, one can see these two currents coming 
closer together. Business, after all, is not one thing but many 
activities requiring different skills. However, if we accept business 
is nonetheless nearly unanimous in opposing government 
programs that redistribute wealth, then we are likely to conclude 
that the thrust for market- based reforms is not a stand- alone 
movement— it is nestled in the shift toward neoliberalism on a 
global level.
At the same time standards- based reform was being trans-
formed into a monitoring regime— one might say a modern 
Panoptican— other reforms, including the advent of charter 
schools, attacks on teachers’ collective bargaining rights, and the 
effort to restructure remuneration based on proxy measures of 
productivity, employed the hegemonic logic of late- 20th- and 
early- 21st- century neoliberal political economy 
regimes— weakening public control and relying on market 
mechanisms. And it will all get worse if these concentric circles 
have their way— if teachers, instead of having some degree of 
autonomy, become the handmaidens of assessment.
Economic logics and democratic logics will never perfectly 
overlap, for education or anything else. The promotion of creative 
and critical thinking might be a common ground for both eco-
nomic and democratic perspectives, but from a business perspec-
tive, creative and critical thinking may have a negative aspect to  
the extent they question authority structures and the status quo.  
So, too, might deliberative democracy be considered an encum-
brance to be overcome or an obstacle to be avoided.
Capitalist Exploitation, Good and Bad: Contending 
Perspectives Historically Considered
We can group many issues together by talking about “the Problems 
of capital(ism)’s excesses.” If we take the three factors of produc-
tion, land, labor, and capital, the last is the dominant factor in 
capitalism.44 Moreover, the way capitalism works, capital is meant 
to exploit the other factors of production.
I do not necessarily mean “exploit” in a pejorative sense but 
merely in the more generic sense of “to put in use.” A business 
operator who employs capital and finds a job for labor or turns 
 2) the U.S.- instituted standardized testing on a nearly 
nationwide basis in the 1990s;
 3) at the same time creativity began to decline in the U.S.;
 4) therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the testing regime 
may well have reduced creativity;
 5) and thus, it may very well have made the U.S. less 
competitive than it would have been otherwise by 
removing an important ingredient that helps the 
economy to advance. QED. Almost.
44 This is treating capitalism in the abstract, but concrete capitalism 
always involves other factors. For instance, antebellum capitalism in 
the South of the U.S. can plausibly be described as a combination of 
capitalism, patriarchalism, and racism. In Germany and Japan, one might 
venture that the three legs of the stool would be capitalism, the inherited 
post- feudal honorific system, based on notions of the landed aristocracy 
and the power of the landed classes and a burgeoning nationalism that 
developed in the face of military threats from other nations.
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marginal land into productive farmland is at the core of capitalism’s 
energy and productivity. Moreover, business is set up to 
“exploit”— to put factors of production into play and profit. This is 
generally to the good, but it has a dark side, for business is not set 
up to consider the negative effects on labor or land. Predictably, 
workers are not always treated well, and the environment is often 
abused.
In sum, nonpejorative exploitation is not sharply set off from 
excessive exploitation. The difference is an ethical or moral 
judgment, and that judgment is extrinsic to the core processes of 
production and profit- making. What is more, ethical and moral 
judgments are not made in isolation but within the context of an 
interacting culture in which business has great influence.
These norms are not disinterested but socially conditioned. 
Where, then, does one draw the line? What is acceptable 
exploitation? What goes beyond the pale?
As for education, there are additional questions. If strategies 
are proven to work in business, why would they not be applied to 
education? If business engages in segmentation strategies, 
shouldn’t we be likely to find them at the core of business’s 
approach to education?
These are questions that should properly be considered the 
terrain of deliberation in a democracy, but the emphasis on 
economistic logics looks at this type of “limit- setting” by delibera-
tion as an immense danger. So, too, is state regulation of economic 
projects. When we talk about speech, we worry about chilling 
effects and self- censorship. Business orientations also worry about 
chilling effects on strategies and actions, as well as  
the consequent decisions to curtail investment.
That is not to say that these worries are groundless, but the 
logic of business focused on profit and loss for the enterprise; 
considerations of social cost and social benefit are secondary and 
are largely outside their purview. The logic of deliberative democ-
racy runs in the other direction; social cost and social benefit are 
primary, while the cost and benefits of individual and enterprises 
are for the most part considered in that context.45
Let us, then, look briefly at the historical context of business 
influence and education.
Business influence is nothing new in the U.S., and current 
attacks on the public education system, which have been a constant 
of the discourse on American education for half a century (see 
Berliner & Biddle, 1995; Emery & Ohanian, 2004; Ford, 2012, 
“Section E: Quote and Research”), are also a way of restaging 
debates on education that go back to Horace Mann and the 
Common School movement. More pointedly, since the late 1800s, 
economic goals have been an important component informing 
education in the United States.46
45 This is not to say they are equivalent— business logics can support 
private profits even if they are outweighed by social costs and often, 
as in the case of polluters, ignore negative externalities. Deliberative 
democracy, however, must take into account private costs.
46 Larry Cuban’s “Making Public Schools Business- Like . . . Again,” 
provides a succinct overview.
As identified by Kliebard (1986), there are four types of 
curricula that have vied for dominance in American schools:
• social efficiency, which urges that schools be oriented to 
economic needs and training of the work force
• humanism, or the liberal arts tradition, which emphasizes 
general intellectual skills and familiarity with the cultural 
traditions of society and understanding of other cultures
• social meliorism, which sees the schools as an instrument 
for social, political, and economic change
• developmentalism, which starts with the psychological 
development of the learner and the needs of the individual 
learner
While hardly new, the pervasive reach of business- oriented 
approaches is the most notable aspect of education reform since 
the 1980s. For the last nearly 40 years, the first goal has eclipsed the 
others. Consequently, social efficiency had been defined in terms 
of economic goals, and the humanist perspective has been chal-
lenged by the ideal of a “modern individual,” competitive, entre-
preneurial, and acquisitive, in keeping with the creation of a 
“nation of owners” (see Valdes, 2008, p. 6.).47 In accordance, social 
meliorism has a new, highly influential strand— a school, with 
roots in the works of Joseph Schumpeter and Ayn Rand, in which 
the entrepreneur is the hero of history. Finally, developmentalism, 
in the most common neoliberal view, can be adequately addressed 
through Skinneresque theories and a type of mechanical causalism 
in which incentives, primarily monetary incentives as provided by 
the market, create the motive force of social change.
Business Logics and the Marginalization of Democratic 
Deliberation
It is noteworthy that the “social efficiency” approach, while not of 
recent vintage, was not how education was argued for in the early 
days of the republic. While it seems quite plausible to us that 
Americans prior to the 1860s would view education as an instru-
ment of economic advance and development, “explicit connections 
between economic development and education by contemporaries 
were infrequent and vague. . . . Nowhere was the contribution of 
education to economic growth emphasized . . . Even in treatises on 
political economy written by Americans in the 1820s and 1830s, 
education was a minor theme” (Kaestle, 1983, pp. 25– 26).
Rather, education was seen in terms of vice and virtue. The 
want of education led to misery, immorality, and distress for  
the individual. Also, “republicanism united concepts of virtue, 
balanced government and liberty,” and inculcation of the virtues of 
“discipline, sacrifice, simplicity and intelligence” were essential for 
the creation of republican citizens (Kaestle, 1983, pp. 4– 5).48 It was 
47 Valdes takes this to be the Chilean model, but it can be applied more 
generally to neoliberal programs.
48 Kaestle pointed to Jefferson, Noah Webster, Benjamin Rush, and 
George Clinton as holding these views but questioned to what degree 
these were put into effect, noting that the institution of property taxes for 
schools was widely opposed.
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this virtuous citizenry who would maintain that liberty and 
virtues, in turn, depended upon the education of all so that not 
only could the best men refine and articulate the general will but 
so, too, would the general population see the wisdom of their 
decisions.
With industrialization and urbanization, business influence 
was reflected in the model of mass education that developed in the 
first third of the 20th century and became the norm, more or less, 
for the rest of the century. That model has not been phased out, but 
it has been challenged by a wave of business influence that is 
markedly different.
Moving away from heavy industry to lean production and 
emphasizing how the individual must prepare themselves to shift 
from one employer to the next, perhaps a dozen times in a lifetime, 
a new model of education developed that represented “a sea change 
from the traditional outlook American business leaders [had] 
brought to school reform: one that sought to sort students and 
select only a few for higher- education, while sending the rest to the 
manufacturing, agricultural or service sectors.” In contrast, 
business reformers now
coalesce around an agenda that includes implementing Common Core 
academic standards and tying teacher evaluation, job security, and 
pay to students’ test scores. The underlying idea is that extraordinary 
teachers, with high standards for all students, can prepare every child 
to attend and succeed in college, regardless of a student’s 
socioeconomic disadvantages. (Goldstein, 2013)
Merit, specifically honed to find its place under the new, neoliberal 
sun, was at the core of the model; at the same time, public asset 
privatization, sky- rocketing college tuition, wage stagnation, and 
lower salaries for public school teachers made the model seem 
disingenuous.49
49 While different studies find different results on changes in teacher 
remuneration, when adjusted for inflation, salaries have gone down 
somewhat nationwide, but with a wide variation among states, with 
Indiana having a 15% decline since 2000 and North Dakota having 
a 20% increase. Business Insider, using data from the Department of 
Education’s National Center for Education Statistics, found that while 
nominal teacher salary has increased, when adjusted for inflation, it was 
“about 1.3% lower than the $61,275 (in 2017– 2018 dollars) average in 
the 1999– 2000 school year” (Perino & Kiersz, 2019). The Rockefeller 
Institute of Government’s “Teacher Salary Trends, 2002– 17” tells us 
“average teacher salaries have grown across the nation from 2007– 17 
[but] in a number of states these increases haven’t kept pace with the 
salaries of other occupations” (Malatras & Simons, 2019). It is not clear, 
however, whether their figures were adjusted for inflation, but it seems 
they probably weren’t. (They included one piece of information that 
was really instructive, a table listing “Median Teacher Salary by Wealth 
Category” in New York state. In the wealthiest, “Low- Need” districts, the 
median was $113,164; in “High- Need Urban/Suburban” and “High- Need 
Rural”— the least wealthy— median salaries were $71,092 and $56,613 
respectively; in “Average- Need,” the median was $65,106.) EdSurge, 
using data from the National Education Association (NEA) and the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), claimed there was a 
drop of 1.6%, adding “pay adjusted for the cost of living . . . decreased 
While it is beyond the scope of this article, it helps to put these 
developments in historical context. We will look briefly at the 
conditions that made possible the advent of neoliberalism through 
several pathways: by force of arms in Chile, through the ballot box 
in the UK and the U.S., and with the aid of International Financial 
Institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 
much of the developing world. To focus specifically on education, 
one should then go on to look at how public K– 12 education in the 
U.S. has been affected.50
As Slavin (1999) once noted, education in the U.S. has been in 
“an uninterrupted state of reform . . . since the publication of A 
Nation at Risk” in 1983 under the Reagan administration and then 
continuing into the first of the Bush administrations. While he 
made this comment two decades ago, reforms have continued 
apace and uninterrupted reform continues. As just indicated, 
Slavin went on to note that “throughout that time, the main focus 
of reform has been on school governance and accountability” 
(p. 325). The link between governance and accountability— how 
they have shaped one another— may be the key to understand-
ing the reform process.
A Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, 1983), like other influential documents before it, linked 
the nation’s temporary failures in international competition to the 
supposed and systematic failures of the school system. All in all, 
the purposes of education were narrowed, with civics, art and 
music, and physical education being marginalized and science, 
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) programs expanded.51 
The emphasis became job and college readiness; “accountability” 
became a watchword of those who called for systematic reform; 
and a single metric of “achievement”— achievement as measured 
by standardized tests— became ascendant.
as much as 15 percent between the years 2000 through 2017” (Abamu, 
2018). Finally, the NEA itself announced, “Average Teacher Salary Down 
4.5 percent, NEA Report Finds,” based on its annual “Rankings of the 
States 2018 and Estimates of School Statistics” (NEA, 2019).
50 Again, this is something I work to do in both Social Learning and 
Hegemony (Ford, 2016a) and Democratic Education and Markets (Ford, 
n.d.). The two works are interconnected.
51 As an almost embarrassed afterthought, some STEM programs added 
the letter “A” for “Art,” to become STEAM in about 2014. STEAM is a 
movement championed by the Rhode Island School of Design (RISD). It 
nonetheless still has an economic motivation:
In this climate of economic uncertainty, America is once  
again turning to innovation as the way to ensure a prosperous 
future. Yet innovation remains tightly coupled with STEM 
to STEAM Science, Technology, Engineering and Math— the 
STEM subjects. Art + Design are poised to transform our 
economy in the 21st century just as science and technology 
did in the last century. We need to add Art + Design to the 
equation— to transform STEM into STEAM. (STEM to STEAM 
website, accessed June 2016, http:// stemtosteam .org/)
If it works, maybe we will all see the clouds move across the sky and 
get to pick the building that we want to live in.
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One must also consider whether, in supporting both free 
market orthodoxy and the idea that schools be reformed on  
a market emulation model, reform has made room for those who 
would privatize, profit, and at the extreme, engage in predatory 
corporate behavior (see, for instance, Faux, 2012). This is a 
systematic issue— in opening public education to private enter-
prise, inevitably there is a systematic effect as individual incentives 
aggregate and become a political force.
These numerous and parallel efforts do have substantial 
effects, so this does not necessarily mean that we must resort to 
“conspiracy” theories. “Movement” might be a better word, or we 
could speak of it as a reaction to circumstances. A blackout and an 
electrical outage are not part of a conspiracy among looters to 
create the conditions possible for looting, but when the conditions 
are right, then people will step in— it is predictable, and sociolo-
gists presumably can pretty much tell us with a reasonable degree 
of accuracy which situations are more likely to result in looting 
(Genevie et al., 1987; Leverentz, 2012; Rosenfeld, 1997).
Economists presumably can make similar predictions about 
markets— that, since a market with minimal regulations will have 
actors who are less than high- minded, some unsavory things will 
result. But here the analogy breaks down, for presumably the 
looters do not have any influence on the electric company. Those 
engaging in predatory practices and profiteering, however, do have 
political influence and therefore may very well have effects  
on policy.
I don’t want to be as alarmist as the sometimes literally 
inflammatory looting analogy suggests— this is the extreme end of 
things. But it is also worse than looting (and closer to a conspiracy) 
in that the parallel efforts at reform have as a goal opening up the 
public education system to private enterprise. These include 
presumably nonpredatory, but profit- making, enterprises— “good 
corporate citizens,” such as Microsoft and Facebook— that engage 
in broad philanthropic endeavors but also have agendas, in terms 
of both their core businesses and creating a business- friendly 
environment overall (see Greene, 2015; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014; 
Snyder, 2015).52
Here the prestige of innovation is used in order to appropriate 
authority, but instead of pursuing that path, let me for now just 
mention that the reputation of being the new thinkers who will 
“lead us to a better world” is counter- balanced by some more 
typical business leanings. Microsoft was long famous for short- 
term contracts and the use of temporary workers; they were not 
52 More accurately, it is the Gates and Zuckerberg foundations rather 
than Microsoft and Facebook themselves. I tend to think that distinction 
is not all that important. Even if there is a wall between the mother 
corporation and the philanthropic foundation similar to the wall 
between the business, news, and editorial sides of a news organization, 
one would be surprised to find that the offspring foundation had 
markedly different views than the founders who started the companies. 
While that is not as likely to be true of older foundations, such as 
Annenberg or Ford, it would be true of newer ones, which invoke 
“venture philanthropy”  
and “social entrepreneurship” and claim to be innovative, ambitious, and 
strategic— in short, more like a business.
only a leader in technology, they were also a leader in the 
implementation of many neoliberal business practices, including 
hiring so- called “perma-temps,” long- term temporary employees 
who work for an extended period for a single staffing client.53
Outsourcing to business service providers potentially allows 
for reductions in wages for the contracted- out jobs (Houseman & 
Heinrich, 2015). In particular, the word “perma-temp” refers to a 
form of domestic outsourcing that reduces wages and contributes 
to worker insecurity; in contrast with “offshoring,” the service 
provider is located in the same country.54 Like outsourcing, 
offshoring is one of multitudinous global processes of neoliberal-
ism and market orientation in which increasing pressure is put on 
local labor markets and on individuals to be flexible. As Bourdieu 
(1998) stated, “competition is extended to individuals themselves, 
through the individualization of the wage relationship.”
This makes social logic subservient to business imperatives— 
businesses must compete; society must adapt to business necessi-
ties. There is little room for deliberation and democratic outcomes 
because the market allows few and limited options.
The analogy is with Darwin: You must find your niche in the 
supposedly natural world of economic competition. As Harvey 
(2005) argued, what is left is only a core economic logic based on 
competition and efficiency— the well- being of individuals can best 
be advanced “by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (p. 2). 
Conceptions that are at the center of liberal democracy, such as 
conceptions of fairness and liberty— the Rawlsian essentials that 
we find in Gutmann’s work— are de- emphasized and redefined in 
business- friendly terms.
Anti- union arguments are a chief example of this. Because 
they do not accept the outcomes of the market, the labor organiza-
tion is derided as the formation of distributional coalitions that are 
somehow thought corrupt. But this is a more general phenom-
enon. Fairness is not the chance to follow a path that leads to 
self- realization— it is to have equal access to the limited opportuni-
ties the market provides.
Education is a chief example. It is reconfigured; “the fatal 
obstinacy” of the discipline of economics “plays a determining role 
in the production of goods and services as in the production of the 
producers themselves” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). In this framing, 
education is never taken on its own terms. Beyond that, the 
imperatives of education in general— building community, looking 
to the well- being of future individuals— and of democratic 
53 In 2000, Microsoft Corp. paid
$97 million to settle a federal lawsuit from employees who 
claimed the software giant classified them as “temporary” 
workers for years to deny them standard benefits such as health 
insurance and the lucrative employee stock purchase plan, 
thereby saving the company millions. (D. Wilson, 2000)
54 The term seems first to have arrived in print with Eisenberg, 1999. 
See also Houseman and Heinrich, 2015.
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education in particular, what Gutmann calls “conscious social 
reproduction,” are explicitly rejected.
The justificatory discourse presents
the economic world [as] a pure and perfect order, implacably 
unrolling the logic of its predictable consequences, and prompt to 
repress all violations by the sanctions that it inflicts, either 
automatically or— more unusually— through the intermediary of its 
armed extensions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the policies they impose: reducing labour costs, reducing public 
expenditures and making work more flexible (Bourdieu, 1998; see also 
Blyth, 2013a, 2013b; Stark, 2006).
Given this background of ideological (and real) struggles,55 we 
should not be reprimanded for thinking there was an effort to 
reform the education system that had to be politically organized 
and institutionally secured. Could this include a refutation of 
Gutmann’s work? While it does require one to include events, such 
as the 1983 issuance of A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for 
Educational Reform, that predate the 1987 publication of 
Democratic Education, this is a case that is not hard to make.
For one thing, previous to the book, Gutmann published 
articles on democracy and education (Gutmann, 1982a, 1982b, 
1983a, 1983b), and it is highly likely that there were drafts of the 
book in limited circulation. But I remind the reader that the 
argument is not that neoliberal education reformers actually sat 
down and read Gutmann’s book and only then decided on a 
strategy to reshape the schools. Rather, I find it really curious that 
one could read the reform movement in that way and make sense 
of it.
In this way, the “conceit” I spoke of was preceded by puzzle-
ment. What such a reading would reveal is not merely differing 
opinions but a fundamental opposition between those who want 
the schools to develop and implement programs promoting 
55 Advocates of the market often claim that they are “without ideology.” 
“End of ideology” (e.g., Bell) and “end of history” (e.g., Fukuyama) 
arguments depict the liberal order— the combination of liberal 
democracy and mostly self- regulating markets— as the culmination of 
human history, an institutional end point. I am instead using “ideology” 
in a nonpejorative sense, as descriptive and conveying foundational 
understandings, much in line with the way an anthropologist or 
sociologist would use “culture.” As Geuss (1981) has pointed out, the 
use of the term “ideology” differs depending on research context. In 
the context of social anthropology (i.e., the study of human social 
organization), ideology can be used in a “purely descriptive sense” that 
“is non- evaluative” in that one neither praises nor blames those who have 
an ideology (pp. 4– 5). In other words, calling something an ideology 
means the question of whether it is good, bad, too simplistic, or too 
complex is held in abeyance. Indeed, my assumption is that everyone has 
an ideology— less biased, more biased, whatever. To criticize someone 
for having an ideology would be like criticizing someone for breathing. 
While that doesn’t mean the air we breathe isn’t sometimes bad, the 
holding of an ideology is a necessary element, and we will breathe 
whatever is there. (Someone has suggested that I should quote David 
Foster Wallace on fish and water; instead, but I think I will stick with just 
this.)
deliberative democracy and those who want schools shaped to 
meet economic ends. It may even call for a great work of synthetic 
political theory that would bring these two different approaches 
together, but that is hardly what I am trying to do here.
Rather, at the risk of repeating myself, this is a heuristic 
approach— a practical method of discovery that makes no claim 
that it is optimal or perfect or true. The comparison is meant to 
show that opposition in detail and how the education reform 
movement in the U.S. since the 1980s has both changed the basic 
structure of our public education system and given insufficient 
weight to its democratic purposes.
Both came after the 1970s, when the locus of global power 
shifted. Individual national economies, all with their own national 
bourgeoise, become increasingly integrated, forming “historic 
blocs”— dominant configurations of material capabilities, 
ideologies, and institutions— forged by elites and that transcend 
territorial boundaries.56
In the post– World War II period, national bourgeoises 
competed with one another in a manner different than in the 
period after the 1970s. There was a shift in hegemony not so much 
from one state to another as from state organizations to a transna-
tional system of organization emanating from the ensemble of 
institutions which comprise private enterprise. States are impor-
tant organizations in this depiction but hardly the only organiza-
tions and not necessarily the dominant organizations. Smaller 
states, such as Honduras or Guinea, might be best described as 
nodes on the international system.57
To put this simply, instead of competing national 
bourgeoisies— which I prefer to call a national investor class— there 
is a transnational assemblage of investor classes that is networked 
and interlinked. Enterprises might be dominated by investors from 
one nation, but they made connections with economic actors  
from multiple nations. From a world that could be best described 
as consisting of national investor classes who saw it was to their 
advantage to enter into alliances or arrive at class compromises 
with labor so as to decrease the possibility of social and economic 
disruption, we entered into a world in which investor classes were 
increasingly transnational and competed with each other less on 
the basis of national cohesion and more on their ability to develop 
a global supply- and- distribution system that took advantage of 
wage differentials and moved employment to those locations that 
came closest to the perfect combination of highly skilled, highly 
compliant, and low- wage workers.58
56 The term “historic bloc”— sometimes “historical bloc” (but never 
“historic block”)— has its origins in Gramsi.
57 This view was suggested to me by Doug Chalmers of Columbia 
University during his office hours many years ago.
58 This is hardly an original analysis. For an extended treatment with 
draws on Gramsci, Robert Keohane, John Lewis Gaddis, Robert W. Cox, 
Giovanni Arrighi, Stephen Gill, Michael Mann, Adam Prezworski, and 
others, see Ford, 2017, 2018. (I am working on a volume on this as  
well.) To anticipate a question, I would guess that the current president’s 
efforts to use tariffs to reshape the global system and create a more 
cohesive national investor class will not succeed; there is too much in 
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This is, I hope, obviously an oversimplification, but we see 
results that tend to confirm the description. Income inequality in 
the U.S., which had been decreasing steadily until 1973, began 
widening in a process that has kept steady pace with declining 
union membership and increased ratios of CEO- to- worker pay, 
from about 20:1 to 350:1 (Keizer, 2018). Interestingly, this is also the 
time period in which the U.S. adopted policies that caused it to go 
from being a creditor to a debtor nation (Cline, 2005, ch. 1;  
Kilborn, 1985).
A Nation at Risk brightly reflects these changes. While 
Gutmann’s work is principally normative and does not attempt to 
grapple with the politics around A Nation at Risk, it nonetheless 
anticipates the change in education by outlining precisely what A 
Nation at Risk is not— A Nation at Risk is not an effort to change the 
system in order to sustain democracy in the long run. Instead, 
from A Nation at Risk onward, most education reform was 
explicitly oriented toward economics.
The National Commission on Excellence in Education, 
commissioned by Reagan’s first secretary of education, Terrel Bell, 
came out with A Nation at Risk, which embodied a results- oriented 
orientation that was meant to supplant input- based measures.59 
While labeled a “report,” A Nation at Risk looked much more like 
an advertising insert in a Sunday paper. It did not have a “white 
paper approach” with full attributions; instead, it was presented as 
a glossy brochure without much support for its assertions and no 
consideration of research that would point in different directions. 
Indeed, there was not much reference to research at all.
It did, however, have among its most famous lines, “If an 
unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the 
mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well 
have viewed it as an act of war” (National Commission on Excel-
lence in Education, 1983, p. 5). From here the die was cast— the  
link between our economic performance and our educational 
system was at center stage of education debates. Of course, the 
question was what to do with it.
A Nation at Risk did take a long- term perspective on how to 
build the institutions of public education, but it also made what 
the way of sunk investment in the global assembly- line version of free 
market enterprise. [Note: Written pre-Covid. Pandemics may change this 
calculation, for instance, in favor of regional autarky.]
59 It is commonplace of conservative critiques to dismiss the importance 
of inputs and to instead focus on outcomes. Such approaches, sometimes 
labeled “outcome- based education,” are usually coupled with an attack on 
unions as rent seekers:
The education system still measures its performance primarily 
by inputs, not by results. Its bureaucratic management structure 
insists that schools comply with uniform rules and policies 
and track resources with precision. But it has no capacity to 
encourage and reward good teaching, to weed out incompetent 
principals, or to ensure that children actually learn. (Finn, 
1997)
Of course, such views are in harmony with neoliberal programs 
that seek to cut back on social expenditures and programs that 
redistribute wealth and income.
seemed to be deliberate efforts to avoid addressing social causes of 
school failures. It then pinned the blame for economic and 
educational failures on educators. While there was no suggestion 
of introducing vouchers or tuition tax credits, both of which had 
been advocated by Reagan during the 1980 campaign, that was 
because they were considered nonstarters politically— neither was 
popular with the broader public, and Democrats had a significant 
majority in the Houses of Representatives. Instead there was an 
emphasis on two elements: rigorous teacher training and a 
common and traditional educational core that would be the basis 
of a state- by- state patchwork quilt that would cover the nation in 
nearly uniform, and presumably higher, standards. Thus, the 
standards movement became the main avenue of education  
reform just prior to the publication of Democratic Education 
(Gutmann, 1987).
Despite the fact that the education reform movement had 
already began, Gutmann’s book is almost a handbook, helping to 
catalogue elements of the business- oriented conservative program. 
We can identify three main trends:
First, efforts to offer alternatives to traditional public schools, 
which eventually primarily manifested not in vouchers but in 
school- choice options, especially the enormous growth of  
charter schools from the late 1990s onward. This co- opted parental 
authority.
Second, the standards movement and calls for rigor and 
“excellence in education,” which throughout the 1990s increasingly 
became linked to the use of standardized tests to evaluate student 
performance and to hold districts and schools “accountable” for 
student performance. This limited the role of the state by narrow-
ing the curriculum.
Third, changes in school organization and labor relations that 
allowed for greater discretionary power for administrators and cut 
back on the autonomy of teachers, eventually reflected in changes 
in teacher evaluation systems that linked a teacher’s rating to the 
same standardized tests that accessed student performance. This 
shifted the authority from classroom educators and principals to 
administrators outside the school and outsource suppliers of data 
systems, assessment systems, and curricula.
These three elements are not separate, but interlinked, with 
the system of examinations at the center. It is the instrument used 
to implement changes, define new goals, and determine if they 
have been attained. The overarching premise was that the 
identified “achievement” problems, even if they were socially 
rooted, could be solved by changing the schools. 
This can be placed within the framework of a powerful and 
influential critique— the critique of public enterprise that is nearly 
omnipresent and from which comes the belief that business 
management can bring about untold efficiencies, fire the 
incompetent, and thus use the same or fewer inputs to get better 
results. It really isn’t all that complicated; the theory goes, it isn’t 
that there are deeply ingrained social pathologies— it’s just a 
management issue.60
60 As Andrew Rice (2011) pointed out, “this idea gets a lot of traction on 
Wall Street.” He quotes Brian Zied, a hedge fund manager who tutored at 
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Testing used for evaluation is the indispensable element of  
the system and is the lynchpin of educational reform. Once “rigor” 
and metrics of student performance were established, schools and 
teachers could be ranked and could be found wanting. Once 
traditional public schools were labeled somehow wanting— as 
“failing”— there was a justification for revamping their 
organization and for expansion of school choice. Once “standards 
of excellence” and their measurement were widespread, the 
teachers’ position in this new system— especially teachers in 
schools that had a record of falling short of that standard— could 
be redefined so as to more closely resemble an at- will employee 
dependent on their supervisor’s goodwill than a professional 
whose expertise  
and experience were a source of authority.
“Authority” is the key word in this account, and the main 
question concerns how business interests organized politically and 
institutionally secured their position. There was a political 
movement to implement measures in the school system that would 
emulate the market, especially increased competition and more 
power for administrators to hire and fire whomsoever they 
pleased. Thus, there was an authority shift away from teachers to 
administrators. In addition, the purview of parents’ authority was 
circumscribed, focused on choosing among school options; 
instead of a citizen acting to best improve the schools, the parent 
became a consumer choosing a school. Finally, state authority was 
not conceived expansively to provide a broad education that 
includes arts, music, physical education, and civics but narrowed 
to focus on academic achievement and primarily academic 
achievement in terms of future economic outcomes.
Business influence is most effective not when it is direct but 
when it transmutes other sources of authority. The three sources of 
a charter school in Harlem and has become a donor:
You interact with the kids for a few minutes, and it immediately 
hits you that, wait a minute, these kids can learn like any other 
kids. They just need to be put in an environment with high- 
quality teachers who care about outcomes. Frankly, it’s the same 
incentive system that works in 99 percent of all businesses. You 
reward the people that do well, and part ways with the ones that 
don’t. (para. 16)
What Zied did not seem to realize was that he was already dealing 
with a select group of students: the ones who show up for tutoring. They 
differ considerably from those who do not. This is akin to mentoring 
schemes in business where you select promising candidates to fill a role 
in your organization; my guess is that such programs were a model for 
many business- influenced education reforms. In my own experience, 
teaching at schools in the Bronx that are challenged to meet academic 
standards, the students who stay after school for tutoring are the ones 
who least need it. The ones who attend do need extra help— they are 
often a few years behind in reading and math— but they are usually our 
more diligent students, and others could use that help more. It is the 
students who have spotty attendance records who are most at risk, and 
they tend not to show up for after- school tutoring programs. However, 
programs that emphasize arts, music, or sports and have a social 
component have more success.
authority in Gutmann’s (1987) account have been transmuted in 
substance by the politically organized and alchemical influence of 
business, but it goes beyond that. As its aim seems to be to refute 
the other premises and principles of Gutmann’s work, Gutmann’s 
analysis can serve as guide to the conservative program. First, it 
counters Gutmann’s principle of nonrepression by asserting the 
primacy of the market and calling for society to be modeled by an 
entrepreneurial ethos. Second, it disavows Gutmann’s principle of 
nondiscrimination in favor of school choice and a system of 
selection by supposed merit.
Most striking is the method— this fourth source of authority 
seeks to co- opt, alter, or attack the other three and channel them to 
its purpose. Parental authority is no longer pointed to the citizens’ 
task of ensuring the good of the system as a whole. The focus of 
state authority is narrowed to “student achievement” as defined by 
measures that are linked to economic success and a monitoring 
system to ensure “accountability” is implemented. The authority of 
professional educators is attacked, and a radical reform of the 
teaching profession based on “best practices” in business is 
proposed and advanced.
Generally, the goal of creating a deliberative democracy 
engaged in conscious social reproduction is eschewed in favor of 
accepting the outcomes of the market as dictated by the march of 
great leaders of talent pursuing simultaneously their own self- 
interest and their own idiosyncratic vision. This is the core of 
business influence and how it operates. It is no longer “the fore-
most role of public education is to foster basic democratic prin-
ciples (such as equal opportunity and liberty)” (Ben- Porath, 2004), 
but education is an instrument to other ends. It advocates the 
pervasive theory that, if not the family, then the state and educa-
tional professionals might in fact be the source of a problem that 
could be solved by applying common sense— the common sense of 
what works in business.
The Common Sense of Segmentation
There is a grave danger here, for what works in business is not 
always something that works in democracy. In business, inequality, 
class, and stratification are not necessarily concerns— in fact they 
may be seen as opportunities. For instance, one business strategy is 
to see stratification as a fact and to employ segmentation as a 
business strategy. In so doing, there is little room for the goal of 
enabling democracy or promoting empathy or self- realization in 
other than business- oriented terms and what is likely to result is a 
string of oxymorons. Stratification is not to be addressed— it is to be 
accepted as the normal consequence of the market system.
Moreover, many of the reforms, even while claiming to close 
the achievement gap, are likely to build on and increase social 
stratification. Let us then, at the risk of sounding polemical,61 
further examine this connection between business influence and 
education reform. While on the surface we see arguments about 
fairness and improving educational opportunities for all children, 
the underlying mechanics of business point elsewhere. The public 
61 Of course, engaging in polemics is hard to resist when one is at the 
same time examining polemics.
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face of education reform, for all its seemingly cogent arguments, 
serves to conceal a business- oriented agenda of privatization, state 
retreat, and restructuring of labor relations so as to be more in line 
with at- will employee/contract- worker models. To put it another 
way, it is informed by the eye of the profit hunter.
The question then becomes, what happens to education when 
the primary ethos of a society is acquisitive, grasping— in short, 
monetary?
Looking at the dynamic of stratification, it points to some-
thing new that, while it is not so neatly delimited, we can nonethe-
less see clearly in the institutional forms of publicly funded 
education. While stratification itself is not new, business strategies 
that aim to segment the market in education have shown robust 
growth. Since the 1980s, marketers have used economic and 
behavioral theories combined with data heavy analytical tech-
niques to identify “market segments and product differentiation 
opportunities” (Dickson & Ginter, 1987, p. 1).
What private business strategies do is “segment the market.” 
This involves the subdivision of a market or population into 
segments with defined similar characteristics— dividing a broad 
target market into “subsets of consumers” who have common 
needs and priorities and then designing and implementing 
strategies to target them:
Knowing your target market is the first step in selling your products 
and services. A marketing segmentation strategy further divides your 
target market into subgroups that are easier to manage. Customized 
customer experiences lead to higher customer loyalty and better- 
focused marketing campaigns. A market segmentation strategy 
organizes your customer or business base along demographic, 
geographic, behavioral, or psychographic lines— or a combination of 
them. (CMG Partners, n.d.)
There are many aspects to this. “Five major segmentation 
strategies are (1) behavior segmentation, (2) benefit segmentation, 
(3) demographic segmentation, (4) geographic segmentation, and 
(5) psychographic segmentation.” Sometimes the strategies combine 
different elements, such as selling snow gear to winter- camping 
enthusiasts in Idaho. But “demographics are the most common 
form of segmentation. They divide customers by the structure of 
certain population traits: Age, Gender, Income, Occupation, 
Marital Status, Social Class, Religion, Education” (Business 
Dictionary, n.d.). You’ll notice “race” is not explicitly listed as a 
category, but there are proxies.
In education, we’d have to add “parental status,” but the other 
factors are nonetheless operative and have become more operative 
as the school choice movement has advanced. Part of this has to do 
with the neoliberal hegemony we have experienced for nearly half 
a century, but as Campi argued, the school choice movement is not 
merely a reflection of abstract “hegemonic rationalities” that are 
“rooted in the elite intellectual belief in the efficiency and innova-
tive force of the competitive market form”— it is also rooted in a 
disparate coalition of “tactical actors seeking paths to agency amid 
a field of political possibilities” (Campi, 2018, pp. 401, 399). It is also 
rooted in business opportunities, and these two converge in the 
process of segmentation, for these disparate groups create a 
segmented market.
While “hegemony” might be described in part as that which 
shapes norms and limits what is considered possible, thus placing 
constraints on politics (the so- called art of the possible), hegemony 
is also more than that. Whatever hegemonic rationality there is 
does not float down from the clouds but must be realized in 
specific situations— in other words, hegemony is not just a set of 
ideas and norms but must be implemented and instituted in 
concrete situations and continuously reinforced.
In the case of school choice, Campi (2018) identified three 
groups in an unstable alliance: parents of minority students 
(specifically Black and Latinx parents) in urban areas, Christian 
parents, and advocates of education reform who argue the schools 
are the chief terrain of the struggle for “new civil rights.” One is 
reminded that George W. Bush, in promoting No Child Left 
Behind, called education “the civil rights issue of our time.”62 
Stirring as that rhetoric may be, one may still wonder to what 
extent some of these are true grassroots movements and which  
are shell organizations funded by those who have other agendas  
as well.
Undoubtably much of the support for school choice comes 
from parents who are dissatisfied with the offerings of public 
education. Campi (2018) mentioned, for instance, the Christian 
Right, and the example is illustrative. First, it shows that politics 
does make unlikely bedfellows, as there is a significant element of 
the Christian Right that is segregationist, and yet they seem to be in 
alliance with those saying, “Education is the battleground for civil 
rights.” But the Christian Right is hardly a grassroots movement, or 
if it is, it is a carefully cultivated one.
Campi (2018) pointed out that in these circles “parental 
control became synonymous with market- based reform [emphasis 
added]. . . A range of libertarian, conservative, and free- market 
foundations . . . provided the bulk of funds and organizational force 
to school- choice campaigns at the local level . . . funding private 
schools and [providing] massive flows of grants to support 
city- based voucher school campaigns” (p. 415). Other groups, such 
as the Walton Family Foundation, the K&F Baxter Family Founda-
tion, the Wasserman Foundation, the Eli and Edythe Broad 
Foundation, and the Gates Foundation, are strong supporters of 
charters. Their activities are wide ranging, and they seek to 
influence opinion and policy; for example, three of them— the 
Baxter, Wasserman, and Broad Foundations— also financed the LA 
Times coverage of public education while Broad also backed “a 
62 See Ravitch’s (2009) discussion of “the faux- Education Equality 
Project (EEP), now headed by former New York City’s Schools 
Chancellor Joel Klein and the Reverend Al Sharpton, with the assistance 
of former House Speaker Newt Gingrich.” “Education is the civil rights 
issue of our time” is a popular phrase, variations of which have been used 
by Barack Obama, Arne Duncan, Mitt Romney, and DT and Frank Luntz 
(see E. Brown, 2017).
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proposal to convert nearly half of Los Angeles’s public schools into 
charter schools” (Farhi, 2015).63
Thus, while school choice has some reason to be thought of as 
a “grassroots movement” instead of an assemblage of Astroturf 
groups, the grass is tended much like the fairways and greens of a 
country club’s golf course. The parents who benefit are a significant 
force,64 but they are only one element, and their tactical moves are 
generally limited by other players— they do not have the reach to 
change the limits of the possible by themselves.
Interested parties include not just those who would benefit 
directly from school choice programs, such as charter school 
operators, but those who want to see the “hegemonic rationalities” 
of market- based norms, such as cutbacks to public enterprise, 
reductions in transfer payments, and the structuration of employ-
ment on an “at- will” employee model, to predominate. As for those 
who are actively in the business of education, school choice leads to 
segmentation.
The consequences are evident in school reforms that use 
market- style mechanisms of parental choice and competition 
between schools. The argument is such systems will “leverage 
change by compelling schools to diversify options, develop 
innovations, and increase effectiveness,” but the effect is quite 
something else; “rather than promoting diverse curricular options 
for a wide range of potential students, schools often adopt 
marketing strategies . . . designed to attract ‘better’ students, often 
from schools that are already considered to be successful” 
(Lubienski, 2003).65
And that threatens democracy. At least in part it threatens 
democracy because charters and other privatization measures are 
not scalable. Rather, they tend to create concentrations of students 
who have advantages, either in terms of income and wealth or in 
terms of parental education and involvement.
To put it bluntly, they cherry- pick; many children are left 
behind, and public schools are left to take care of them. As Ravitch 
(2010) has put it, “charter schools siphon away the most motivated 
students and their families in the poorest communities from the 
regular public schools” (p. 227). Ravitch also pointed out that 
Albert Shanker, who in 1988 was one of the first to propose 
63 The Los Angeles Times Editorial Board (2015) endorsed the Broad 
plan in an editorial.
64 I should point out that as a public school parent, I have taken 
advantage of school choice nearly every time I have had the opportunity 
to do so. While I have limited myself to public school choice, navigating 
the systems in Washington, D.C., and New York to find the best 
education possible for my child, if the best option were a charter school, 
I would have considered it. It seemed to me that my duty as a parent 
obligated me to do so, but I should also note that to some extent it 
diverted my attention from improving the public schools. Finally, even 
as I was working within the public school systems, I found it abundantly 
clear that public school choice programs also create problems of inequity.
65 Lubienski’s work was based on an examination of school responses to 
competition in two local education markets, so it is rather small- scale, 
but it indicates that “schools often act in ways that reflect contradictory 
incentives for how schools might engage the marketplace.”
charters, thought of them as “a school within a school [created by 
teachers], where they could develop innovative ways to teach 
dropouts and unmotivated students.” But, as she recounted, by 
1993, “Shanker publicly renounced his proposal. The idea had been 
adopted by businesses seeking profits, he said, and would be used, 
like vouchers, to privatize public schools and destroy teachers 
unions” (Ravitch, 2018).66
Having had my daughter go to just such a “school within  
a school” for two years, I would like to share two anecdotes. The 
school, which we absolutely loved, was considered very successful. 
It was in a large urban district, however, and the area in which it 
was located had started to gentrify a while back. While it was a 
public school (not merely, as charter schools are, a publicly funded 
school), the demographics changed over time, even more so than 
those of the neighborhood. It became a school educating children 
of mainly upper- middle- class parents.
One point of that anecdote is to point out that public schools 
are not immune to the effects of demographic shifts or the concen-
tration of more affluent students in one school and less affluent 
students in another. But that only came about because of the 
institutional structure of the district— it allowed for a degree of 
public school choice, so parents could seek out the school instead 
of attending the local, zoned school. I do not blame the 
parents— after all, I was one them, seeking out the best education 
for my child— but rather, point out that school choice programs 
have some less- than- palatable consequences.
The same can be said about how we draw district boundaries, 
especially how urban districts and suburban districts are divided. 
On reason for this was well put by Katz, who said in 1975 that he 
expected “that any serious effort to equip poor children as effective 
competitors for the well- to- do will meet enormous, and probably 
successful resistance” (Katz, 1971/1975, pp. xviii, 152).
Charter schools are peculiar, however, because they combine 
two elements. They are both an example of public asset privatiza-
tion (Goodman & Loveman, 1991, pp. 26– 28, 32, 34– 36), and they 
are concentrated in poor, urban areas— you do not find them in 
affluent suburban enclave districts (see, for instance, Mckenna, 
2015). The asset in this case is to receive public funds in order to run 
a school. Charter schools generally receive public funding but have 
their own management and governance structure, so they’re free to 
adopt different disciplinary rules, a separate selection process, or 
other policies. Charter schools open up mainly in poorer districts, 
however, and tend to separate out the kids who seem to have the 
most potential and most supportive parents. Thus, the siphoning 
effect, in Ravitch’s phrase, or the culling of students, in mine, both 
pose “the problem of replicating a model that depends on concen-
trating promising students” (see Ford, 2012, p. xxxvi).
While charters account for only about 5% of students who  
are publicly funded, they are polarizing because they take money 
from public schools, which can’t easily lower their costs as they lose 
per- pupil budgetary allotments and lack access to additional 
sources of funding through private donors (Kardish, 2013; Mead et 
66 The article provides a brief summary of her critique.
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al., 2015).67 Moreover, they are part of an increasingly stratified 
system. For Ravitch, “American education seems to be evolving 
into a dual school system, one operated under democratic 
control . . . the other under private control” (Ravitch, 2018).
I would disagree (quibble?) that it is not merely a dual 
system— it has more than two aspects when you consider public 
school choice, magnet schools, home schooling, private schools, and 
the like— but she is absolutely correct in emphasizing the contrast: 
While public schools districts are “required to find a place for every 
student who shows up, no matter that student’s academic skills, 
language or disability,” the same is not true of a “privately managed 
charter [school, which] can limit its enrollment [and] exclude 
students it doesn’t want” (Ravitch, 2018).68 Some state charter laws 
(and they do vary drastically) limit the freedom of charters in hiring 
uncertified teachers and in rejecting students because they have 
special needs, but by no means are all limited in this way.69
The second anecdote concerns how the central district treated 
my favorite daughter’s school. The local educational authority was 
in favor of expanding charters— at the moment roughly a third of 
the districts’ students go to charters. At one point, when my 
daughter’s “school within a school” came to a bureaucratic 
hurdle— its student body size did not fit into any of those approved 
by the central district— the school administration was faced with a 
choice: either embark on an expansion plan or “turn charter.” 
The second option was brought up constantly. Why the 
central district did not just say the school could continue in its 
present form was never clear, but they would not waive what were 
newly established size restrictions even for a school that had been 
exemplary for nearly 20 years. The school eventually decided to 
expand, adding not only additional classes but grade levels. Part of 
this was because parents wanted the school to add the grade levels, 
part of it because the teachers wanted a challenge, and part of it was 
because space was available, but the end result is that the old school 
ceased to exist— 
67 Kardish used a 4.6% figure; an “almost 6%” figure comes from Mead 
et al. The updated version from January 2019 still had the same figure 
and reported that charter school growth has slowed recently.
68 She added that charters can target particular grade levels, for 
instance, not running high schools, which are more expensive. She also 
noted that “charters can even close school for the day to take students to 
a political rally for the school management’s financial benefit. That is not 
fair competition, and it is not healthy for democracy.”
69 Comparisons of state laws usually have criteria that are often 
chosen for political purpose— that is, they are either advocates, such 
as the Center for Education Reform, or detractors, such as the Citizens 
for Public Schools. Two less politically charged comparisons include 
“Charter Schools in the States— A Series of Briefs,” by the avowedly 
bipartisan National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) (http:// 
www .ncsl .org/ research/ education/ charter -schools -in -the -states .aspx) 
and “50- State Comparison: Charter School Policies,” by the Education 
Commission of the States (ECS), https:// www .ecs .org/ charter -school 
-policies/.
 a different school took its place, and the previous remains in  
name only.70
So that leads to the question of what happens to the public 
system re- concocted under business norms. It is not to say there 
are things the public schools could do better, but it is to question 
whether we have lost sight of what public schools are supposed to 
do. 
One of those things is to train future citizens so they can 
contribute to a democratic polity. This is the issue of deliberative 
and participatory democracy. Another is to ensure that we have a 
system that provides a way to meet one’s individual goals regardless 
of one’s background. This is the issue of egalitarian democracy. 
That the public schools have not always been successful in these 
areas is not sufficient reason to dismantle the system unless there is 
another system that can perform those functions. This is especially 
the case when the system works reasonably well— and often quite 
well— for 80% of the population, with its failures largely found in 
areas of concentrated poverty. One must question the motives of 
those who want to overhaul the entire system when the parts of the 
system that do not work as well are for the most part found side by 
side with multiple social pathologies that also go unaddressed.
Another anecdote, this one about the use of a metaphor: at a 
recent parent meeting at a public school on the Upper West Side of 
Manhattan, a well- spoken father, who was also an advocate, spoke 
out against plans to change the selection process for a set of magnet 
schools. He used this metaphor: “We need to create the lifeboats to 
get the kids off a sinking ship.”
I don’t know how many lifeboats he had in mind, or whether 
the kids would stay in the lifeboat or be transported to another ship 
that presumably wasn’t sinking, but this really bothered me. Maybe 
it was because I was thinking of when the Titanic went down, and 
there weren’t enough lifeboats to get everyone off. The man was 
talking about tracking and magnet schools and, while maybe this is 
something I inferred, saying “deserving kids” needed to be saved. 
But what about the other kids? Were they undeserving?
The promise of egalitarian democracy is largely based on the 
promise of public education— that it function to educate the vast 
majority of citizens so that they may aspire and succeed, to 
participate in politics, to help to shape the future.71 At least that is 
70 Based on interviews with teachers at the “school within a school” and 
observations at parent- teacher conferences, spring 2011. I do not want 
to identify the school. It should be noted that since I did not have full 
knowledge of all interactions and that I was not an insider, the choice 
among options may not have been as stark as I have portrayed it, but one 
thing I know for sure is the teachers in the school told me that the central 
district was constantly asking, “Why don’t you go charter?”
71 While I do not want to try by myself or in this article, the difference 
between egalitarian democracy and deliberative democracy is relevant. 
One way of approaching it might be through a Rawlsian lens, invoking 
the original position, that while deliberation might lead to a consensus 
(with the emphasis on “might”), what is desired is a generally egalitarian 
outcome. The question of how much inequality the original position 
would allow is, of course, one that can be argued about just about forever 
(see, for instance, Wolff, 1977).
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one of the major theories in support of universal and compulsory 
education in the U.S. As Horace Mann put it, “Education then, 
beyond all other devices of human origin, is the great equalizer of 
the conditions of men, the balance- wheel of the social machinery” 
(Mann, 1848). The argument is that, without a public education 
system that works, in effect, to redistribute economic opportunity 
to the next generation, democracy under a free market system is 
much more likely to result in a stratified society with limited social 
mobility. Whether democracy can still function under such 
conditions is left an open question.
One essential question we need to work to answer is whether 
contemporary education reform is leading our national education 
system off in directions seemingly far removed from our shared 
understandings of what is necessary for a democracy to function. 
The stratification and segmentation of the public system has 
followed a period in which the problems of education have been 
articulated in economistic terms. Among many consequences of 
the economic patterns we have been following— and which have 
greatly influenced the national educational system— is that public 
education seems not to be working as a leveling device, certainly 
not in outcomes and not even in terms of creating a level playing 
field and equal opportunity.
What is common sense in business does not necessarily lead 
to the common good. Public goods are more than aggregations of 
private goods. They require not merely the aggregation of indi-
vidual interests and desires but an understanding of what a public 
shares in common.
While I was not aware of it until recently and was taken aback 
when I first heard it, this now seems to be a point of some contention. 
Pointing out that there has been a shift in the way some practitioners 
typically define the concept in the field of economics, Abowitz and 
Stitzlein (2018) argued it is no longer merely that a “public good is 
available for all individuals to freely share and virtually impossible to 
exclude others from enjoying” but that “many economists go further, 
claiming that public goods are aggregations of private goods [empha-
sis added]— things that serve the needs, desires, and interests of 
individuals. In other words, public goods are those items that are 
preferred by and benefit the largest group of individuals.”72 This 
would be a huge change in the normative aspect of economics, for a 
new definition creates new norms.
While I have not read all the original articles and am not 
prepared to fully enter the discussion at this point, two points 
should be made. First, the change in definition is a potential 
foundational shift as it changes a fundamental definition that is 
central to the discipline of economics and public policy; by so 
doing, it skews economic analysis and argumentation in a new 
direction. Thus, it is potentially a major change.
Second, such a shift in definition within an academic disci-
pline is one of the leading indicators of a shift in hegemonic 
rationality. That shift can be considered as a shift away from 
Keynesian understandings to those that wound up with Hayek and 
Friedman. From a Keynesian perspective, this is dangerous, for 
when each individual pursues their own interests without regard to 
72 For the first quote, they cite Anomaly, 2018.
the interests of others, the results can be disastrous, such as falling 
wages in a competitive labor market, which lead to lower consumer 
demand, which leads to lower production, which results in even 
lower wages, and so it goes on. As one leftie Scottish academic put 
it, “Keynes’s central message is that individual rational action can 
be collectively disastrous” (Blyth, n.d.). The role of deliberation in a 
democracy might be considered, at least in part, an effort to keep 
the market from falling into such death spirals.
There is also a third point to be made regarding whether 
public education is a public good, but it comes from a different 
source. Many who embrace market- based education reform do 
strongly deny that it is a public good, but they do not, however, 
necessarily use this new definition. Instead, they suggest that 
education should not be treated as a public good as a matter of 
public policy. For instance, Corey DeAngelis (2018) of the Cato 
Institute sticks closer to the economics definition but claims that 
schools need not be public goods by raising the question of 
whether publicly funded schools should have the option to 
exclude. He has argued that
by the strict definition, schooling is not a public good . . . that cannot 
avoid the economic free- rider problem, in which it’s impossible to 
exclude those who have not paid for a service. Schools can do this, if 
they choose, and that’s precisely why private schools already function 
effectively today without government operation or funding.
Arguing somewhat differently on the public good and 
education, Kevin Currie- Knight has defined a public good as being 
non- rivalrous and non- excludable, arguing that “K– 12 education 
has neither of these qualities. First, it is rivalrous,” making the 
argument that there will be rivalries over access to resources,  
such as smaller class size, and, second, “K– 12 education is also 
excludable,” using the example of disabled children who were 
“quite easily excluded from K– 12 education” until 1975 (Curry- 
Knight, 2017).
Both, along with other commentators who used some version 
of the traditional economic definition, usually are making the 
argument that public education is not a public good because it is not 
good. That public “goods” should result in private goods is not an 
argument without merit— for instance, a public park that became a 
toxic waste dump could hardly be thought of as a public good, and 
neither could air that, while non- excludable, was hazardous to 
health. However, that does not justify the converse, that something 
that results in private goods is therefore a public good.73
73 I would hold that a public good still needs to be non- excludable. This 
is a point on which Currie- Knight agrees but which DeAngelis does not; 
they are, in fact, making quite different arguments. I would disagree with 
DeAngelis; the mere fact that something might benefit the largest group 
of individuals does not make that thing a public good. This is especially 
true if the benefit of the larger group is at the expense of the excluded 
group, an argument that I think one could apply to tuition tax credits, 
charters, vouchers, etc. (It could even apply to slavery, I guess, if you took 
seriously the antebellum writings on Locke and the Liberty of Plantation 
owners.) And, of course, they do not necessarily help the largest group 
of individuals but are more likely to divert resources to a select few. A 
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DeAngelis has said this is true “especially when the 
government often runs schools like they run the DMV.” He then 
promoted his forthcoming study
to calculate the net effects of government schools on U.S. society 
overall . . . by comparing the results produced by government schools 
to those produced by a feasible policy alternative: private schools. . . . I 
find that government schooling has huge negative effects on society 
overall. The preponderance of evidence suggests that government 
schooling— relative to private schools— reduces student learning and 
increases crime rates at a higher cost to the taxpayer.
While he said that he “make apples- to- apples comparisons [by 
using] the most rigorous private school choice evidence available 
on academic outcomes, criminal activity, and taxpayer costs” 
(DeAngelis, 2018), unfortunately, he is avoiding the central issue: 
His private “apples” can exclude, and his public “apples” cannot.
This is not to deny that there might be merit in the program 
DeAngelis advocated, “a universal education savings account 
program,” a voucher- type program that allows families to take their 
education dollars to the schools that work best for their children, 
but the funny thing about that is that most current supporters of 
such a program probably would not provide sufficient funds so that 
less affluent families would have a true choice.74 I have speculated in 
the past that almost everyone’s position on the vouchers would 
switch if the voucher were equivalent to the tuition at elite private 
schools. Teachers and teachers unions would be happy about the 
additional resources for education and would probably anticipate 
higher salaries because of the additional revenues; those who worry 
about government expenditures would be against a voucher 
program with a high price tag (Ford 2003, 2004).
The overall point is that while it may not be naturally non- 
excludable and non- rivalrous, a government can decide that it can 
be made so in law and, by coming to a political decision, attempt to 
implement what it defines as a fair system, one that could include a 
principle of non- excludability. Similarly, after appropriate political 
deliberation, it can be proclaimed as a principle enshrined in law 
that we will not allow discrimination, either on the basis of 
intellectual choice or social, economic, and demographic 
background. 
This statement of principle is possible within a democratic 
system after proper deliberation. While the federal government 
does not, many states do have rights to education within their state 
constitutions, including Massachusetts, which has perhaps the 
main example is Chile, in which the educational opportunities are not 
equitably distributed.
74 Bella Rosenberg, former special vice president of the AFT, put it this 
way:
The pervasiveness of market metaphors is quite striking. 
Ed[ucation]. was one of the last holdovers; no more. And 
underlying the “choice” argument is this: the shift from collective 
to individual responsibility. Basically, vouchers say go choose 
(not that we’ll give you enough money to make REAL choices) 
and if you happen to choose wrong, tough. (Personal email, 
May 1999)
highest- ranked public system in the United States. Indeed, such a 
statement pretty much became a requirement for a territory to 
become a state (or for a state that had succeeded to be readmitted) 
by the late 1860s, and “all 50 state constitutions guarantee 
education today. . . . The reasoning of both Congress and the state 
conventions was clear: ‘Education is the surest guarantee of  
the . . . preservation of the great principles of republican liberty’” 
(Black, 2017).75
There is, of course, the matter of the practical implementation 
of the principles, but while privatization and defunding public 
schools may make sense in some theoretical instances, I don’t agree 
that public education deserves the same reputation that the DMV 
does. To be sure, I’m not even sure the DMV deserves its own 
reputation. My bet about the DMV is that it works all right 
overall— well in some states, less so in others— and while it is true 
that going to the DMV may be inconvenient, they are pretty good 
with keeping track of records. Also, the DMV plays an essential 
role in making sure people comply with insurance and other 
regulations, and despite the fact that they can be used as a 
whipping boy for those who want to whip up emotions against 
bureaucracy and the state, DMVs all over the country perform at 
least an acceptable level given the conditions they perform under.
I hate going to the DMV, but it is not because they are incom-
petent; it is because they are overcrowded. It isn’t the service, but it 
is the wait for service, and that problem could be solved pretty 
easily by hiring more people. Should the state pay for more people? 
I don’t know— when I am waiting in line, I think absolutely yes, but 
if my taxes went up by $100 to shorten my wait by 20 minutes, I 
would doubt it. Maybe at some level there are a lot of people at the 
DMV who accept that they will have to wait because they think it 
will keep costs down.
While there might be some corrupt or totally incompetent 
DMV in a few states, or in a few locations within states, but I don’t 
think that adds up to an urgent call to privatize the DMV. Similarly, 
I don’t think the public schools are corrupt or incapable; though 
there certainly are some historical examples, they do not add  
up to an urgent call to privatize public education. Besides,  
private corruption and incapacity has a long lineage as well,  
so privatization has its own risks. What I see all the time is that 
about 80% of the public schools are doing fine academically— 
that schools that are deemed “failing” are disproportionally, and 
maybe almost exclusively, found in areas of concentrated poverty.76 
75 Black’s is an opinion piece in favor of a federal right to education, 
which we do not have as yet, arguing, “Without a federal check, 
education policy tends to reflect politics more than an effort to deliver 
quality education. In many instances, states have done more to cut taxes 
than to support needy students.” There is a through line, which continues 
in an April 26, 2018, tweet by Black, “States cannot continue to ask public 
schools to work with whatever is left over and then criticize them for 
doing a poor job. This cycle creates a circular justification for dismantling 
public education when states should be repairing it.”
76 The rate of failure of American schools, while exaggerated, if 
it exists at all, is often supported by test data. Tests vary, but on 
international tests, basically, the U.S. is in the big bulge in the middle. 
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Private entities might even ask for extra incentives to work in such 
areas, perhaps labeling them “education enterprise zones.”
This does not fit with the monopoly model explanation of 
failed public schooling. It is widely argued that “government 
schools . . . because of residential school assignments . . . currently 
have a significant amount of monopoly power in the education 
market” and therefore have negative effects on the economy. The 
argument is that in education
as with any other industry, monopoly power— and lack of consumer 
choice— leads to a lower quality product at higher costs. Government 
schools are also strapped with heavy regulations such as teacher 
certification requirements, standardized testing mandates, the 
prohibition of admissions criteria, and severely limited principal 
autonomy.77
This is another argument that eats its tail. There are actually 
two arguments. One is that an apples- to- apples comparison shows 
an advantage for private education. Another is— and it is 
true— that public schools have additional regulations, and it might 
well be true that this hurts “performance” as measured by some 
metrics. But if government regulation hurts public school perfor-
mance, then it is not a fair apples- to- apples comparison at all, 
especially if the private schools are able to turn down students at 
the schoolhouse door, especially if they are high- poverty and/or 
high- needs schools.
Public schools may have the advantage of being quasi- 
monopolies in some residential districts, but it also may be that one 
unified school district may have distinct advantages over several 
competing private school options, that they might, in terms of 
offering diverse course offerings, special education programs, 
transportation, counseling services, extracurriculars, and other 
items, have an advantage. Their size may be a benefit.78 They might 
even be compared to natural monopolies in many ways. 
Taking the average scores and rankings for the eighth- grade Progress 
in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) in 2006, the U.S. is 
ranked 18th out of 45 (10th out of 20 OECD countries), ahead of France, 
England, Austria, New Zealand, and Norway, among others; the 17 
ahead of the U.S. include four Canadian provinces, so if Canada was 
listed once, the U.S. would be 14th. Just like the scores, explanations 
vary as to U.S. rankings. Steve Krashen said this is about what we should 
expect once we factor in poverty levels. Also, according to Iris Rothberg, 
in the United States, socioeconomic status accounts for close to 80% of 
the difference test scores (Rothberg, 2011). Supplemental educational 
services (SES) is also reflected in racial disparities (I doubt it is the other 
way around); in the 2006 Program for International Student Assessment 
(PISA), “on the combined science literacy scale in the United States, 
Black (non- Hispanic) students (409) and Hispanic students (439) scored 
lower, on average, than White (non- Hispanic) students (523).” For 
comparison’s sake, South Korea ranked seventh among OECD countries 
with an average of 522; Finland was first with 563, Mexico dead last with 
410 (see Baldi et al., 2007; Bybee, 2009).
77 This comes from DeAngelis (2018), but it is a common enough theme 
in attacking public schools.
78 This is much the same logic as employed by the Harlem Children’s 
Zone and the Obama administration’s Promise Neighborhoods program, 
But I am not trying to come to a definitive resolution of the 
public- private question, just point out that there are other 
perspectives. On the one hand, the way the apples don’t line up 
should not be dismissed. On the other, it needs to be pointed out 
that public schools take on responsibilities that private schools 
don’t, and that is something  
we have decided is a good idea as a country.
Public schools have additional responsibilities. They could be 
cheaper if we did not impose those responsibilities on them. There 
was, however, a political decision that we would adopt certain 
regulations and certain principles. They were supposed to be worth 
the cost. To some extent, they line up with Gutmann’s (1987) two 
principles. We don’t exclude; we don’t discriminate— at least, those 
are our stated principles.
Private schools are not held to that. Private religious schools 
are sometimes explicitly discriminatory, based on faith.79 It is not 
just that the apples don’t line up. The terrain of modern public 
education was built on these promises, on democratic decisions 
after some sort of deliberative process. Clearly there could be a 
different democratic decision after further deliberative 
process— clearly we could be in the middle of such a delibera-
tive process now— but if that process is going to maintain 
deliberative democratic decision- making and, perhaps, advance 
egalitarian concerns, then it is going to put conditions on the 
institutions of education that are publicly funded.
For Gutmann (1987), the public shared in the deliberations 
that are the substance of democratic self- governance. Public 
education has been thought of as one of the bedrocks of a demo-
cratic republic since at least Adams’s and Jefferson’s time. Jefferson 
the latter established under the legislative authority of the Fund for the 
Improvement of Education Program (FIE).
The vision of the program is that all children and youth growing 
up in Promise Neighborhoods have access to great schools and strong 
systems of family and community support that will prepare them to 
attain an excellent education and successfully transition to college and 
a career. The purpose of Promise Neighborhoods is to significantly 
improve the educational and developmental outcomes of children and 
youth in our most distressed communities, and to transform those 
communities.
It is, however, oriented to support and declare eligible entities 
only if they are other than public entities, “including (1) nonprofit 
organizations, which may include faith- based nonprofit organizations, 
(2) institutions of higher education, and (3) Indian tribes” but excluding 
public entities, such as school districts (US DOE, 2018).
79 We should consider the religious aspect when deciding whether to 
expand the thumbnail sketch of true believers who firmly believe that 
research shows that we should adopt these measures to improve the 
system; political actors who want to adopt these positions for political 
advantage; and those who see the adoption as advantaging them 
economically. Religious communities wanting to bring up their children 
in religious schools are both true believers and political actors but of a 
different sort in each case— true believers in the value of religion and 
political actors who want parents holding those beliefs to influence they 
children. In terms of anti- public- school sentiment, religiously oriented 
parents are a large and significant group.
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argued that there was a direct correlation between literacy— 
defined rather broadly— citizenship, and successful self- 
government (D. L. Wilson, 1999, p. 80). As Adams put it, “a general 
knowledge and sensibility have prevailed among the people, 
arbitrary government and every kind of oppression have lessened 
and disappeared in proportion” (Adams, 1765).
We should consider this as our educational system is increas-
ingly influenced by business interests. Public education has many 
goals, but free societies require citizens who are self- governing, 
and we cannot allow public education to not serve those needs and 
merely function as a market. We can return to Adams, who had 
singular success in calling for assertive and energetic government 
intervention. He did so in his own state by drafting the Massachu-
setts Constitution, the one referred to previously, the oldest written 
constitution still in use today. While he expected it to be stricken, 
what he wrote remains in the constitution to this day:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among 
the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their 
rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the 
opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of  
the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall  
be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this 
commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, 
and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, 
public schools and grammar schools in the towns; to encourage private 
societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the 
promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, 
manufactures, and a natural history of the country; to countenance 
and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, 
public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and 
punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social 
affections, and generous sentiments among the people. (“The 
Encouragement of Literature, etc.,” chapter V, section II of  
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts)
Whatever his other faults, Adams should be given great credit, 
for his support for education was not limited to a privileged elite 
but was tied to conceptions of the mutual interdependence and the 
destiny shared by all members of a society: “Laws for the liberal 
education of youth, especially of the lower class of people, are so 
extremely wise and useful, that, to a humane and generous mind, 
no expense for this purpose would be thought extravagant” 
(Adams, 1776).
One hopes his words are not just a dead letter. One hopes that 
there will still be room for this type of serious and deliberative 
decision- making that is central to maintaining a democracy, that 
decision- making as it exists in consumer choice does not squeeze it 
out, and that decision- making as it exists in business practice and 
consumer choice will not deny its purpose. But we’ll see.
Note on Other Works to Which This Article Is Connected
This article is the first of four on the “Sources of Authority in 
Education,” all of which use the work of Gutmann as a heuristic 
device to describe and explain the prevalence of market- based 
models of education reform in the United States. The present 
article, “Negating Amy Gutmann,” looks primarily at deliberative 
democracy. The next, “Neoliberalism and Four Spheres of 
Authority,”  considers, primarily, the promise of egalitarian 
democracy and how figures such as Mann, Dewey, and Gutmann 
have argued it is largely based on the promise of public education. 
It thus begins with a consideration of what might be called a partial 
historical- materialist analysis— the growth of inequality in the 
United States (and other countries) since the 1970s that correlates 
with much of the basis for changes in the justifications and 
substance of Education reform. The third article, “The Odd 
Malaise of Democratic Education and the Inordinate Influence of 
Business,” begins by offering some historical background and 
comparisons and ends by considering what happens to the 
philosophy of education when democracy and capitalism are at 
odds. The fourth article is on changing notions of civics, “Profit, 
Innovation and the Cult of the Entrepreneur: Civics and Economic 
Citizenship.”
All are included together in a book manuscript, hopefully to 
see the light of day, Democratic Education and Markets: 
Segmentation, Privatization, and Sources of Authority in Education 
Reform. The book as presently planned begins with a theoretical 
chapter on paradigm change.80 The book also includes a suggestive 
conclusion, “Robert Pirsig, John Dewey, and John Adams: Defin-
ing Quality, Efficiency, and the Benefits of Liberal Education.”
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